Daily Papers

Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as social-engineering attacks, manipulates autonomous web agents into submitting users' personally identifiable information (PII) to attacker-controlled endpoints. In this paper, we show that social-engineering attacks are highly effective at extracting critical-tier PII from frontier web agents, posing a severe risk to deployed agentic systems. To quantify this risk, we introduce \textsc{Scammer4U}, a pre-registered benchmark of 91 attacker-controlled environments and 10 benign-twin baselines, spanning 8 attack vectors and 16 site categories on an 8-axis factorial taxonomy that isolates the causal contribution of individual attack design factors. Across frontier agents, we find that critical-tier PII leakage reaches 54--93\% under no privacy guidance, compared to 0\% on benign-twin baselines, confirming that leakage is attack-attributable rather than incidental form-filling. Escalating prompt-level mitigation yields sharply model-dependent reductions across the four families and remains insufficient to reliably prevent critical PII submission at the pooled level. Most critically, we identify a detection--action gap: agents whose reasoning an independent LLM judge confirms has flagged the site as suspicious still submit critical PII in 35.9\% of sessions, versus 66.1\% when no suspicion is verbalized, a 30.2\% gap robust across all four model families. Our findings reveal that defenses conditioned on the agent's own recognition of an attack are gating on the wrong signal, motivating output-level interception of outbound submissions that operates independently of the agent's reasoning loop.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

On-policy distillation (OPD) has become a central post-training tool for large language models (LLMs), providing dense per-token teacher supervision along the student's own rollouts. In this work, we identify a common structural cause underlying OPD, which we call prefix failure. Under prefix failure, dense per-token supervision induces a bimodal teacher mixture and fragmented gradients that token-level loss truncation or reweighting fail to address. This observation motivates us to move beyond token-level loss interventions toward trajectory-level output corrections. We thus propose Trajectory-Refined Distillation (TRD), a trajectory-level correction method that revises the student's rollout under the teacher guidance while within on-policy support. By correcting problematic prefixes before distillation, TRD mitigates prefix failure at its source. Moreover, TRD improves the exploration by exposing the student to alternative valid derivations under teacher guidance, even when the original rolls are already correct. TRD can also be applied to on-policy self-distillation (OPSD), a parameter-sharing variant that uses the student model conditioned on privileged informations as the teacher. Across a wide range of benchmarks and base models at multiple scales, TRD consistently outperforms prior baselines, improving single-attempt accuracy and broadening reasoning coverage. Code is available at https://github.com/louieworth/trd

Language models (LMs) can produce gendered language and stereotypes even when given neutral prompts. Most prior work on gender bias in LMs primarily examines gender through a binary lens (feminine vs. masculine), with limited attention to gender-neutral forms, such as they/them pronouns or neutrally phrased job titles. How gender-related signals are encoded in the internal representations of LMs remains an open question. In this work, we study gender-specific neurons in LMs across three categories: feminine, masculine, and gender-neutral. We propose a neuron-level intervention method to identify neurons that are strongly tied to each gender category. We then test these neurons through controlled generation, showing that activating or masking gender-related neurons can steer a sentence toward a target gender form while preserving its original meaning. To evaluate the effectiveness of our gender-intervention approach, we curate two datasets with controlled sentences labeled across all three gender categories and validate the data quality through human evaluation. Experiments on two open-source LMs show that gender-specific neurons are not evenly distributed across model layers; instead, they concentrate heavily in the earliest layers with smaller contributions from later layers. Compared to existing methods, our method achieves more precise gender control, with less leakage into non-target gender categories and stable output quality through two evaluation criteria. Overall, our work examines how gender is encoded in LMs and provides a simple yet effective approach toward controlled gender intervention for both neuron intervention evaluation and gender bias mitigation. Code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/zhiwenyou103/Gender-Neuron-Intervention

AI Agents can perform complex operations at great speed, but just like all the humans we have ever hired, their intelligence remains fallible. Miscommunications aren't noticed, systemic biases have no counter-action, and inner monologues are rarely written down. We did not come to fire them for their mistakes, but to hire them and provide a safe productive working environment. We posit that we can reuse a common corporate organizational structure: teams of independent AI agents with strict role boundaries can work with common goals, but opposing incentives. Multiple models serving as a team of rivals can catch and minimize errors within the final product at a small cost to the velocity of actions. In this paper we demonstrate that we can achieve reliability without acquiring perfect components, but through careful orchestration of imperfect ones. This paper describes the architecture of such a system in practice: specialized agent teams (planners, executors, critics, experts), organized into an organization with clear goals, coordinated through a remote code executor that keeps data transformations and tool invocations separate from reasoning models. Rather than agents directly calling tools and ingesting full responses, they write code that executes remotely; only relevant summaries return to agent context. By preventing raw data and tool outputs from contaminating context windows, the system maintains clean separation between perception (brains that plan and reason) and execution (hands that perform heavy data transformations and API calls). We demonstrate the approach achieves over 90% internal error interception prior to user exposure while maintaining acceptable latency tradeoffs. A survey from our traces shows that we only trade off cost and latency to achieve correctness and incrementally expand capabilities without impacting existing ones.

We introduce a red-teaming methodology that exposes harder-to-catch attacks for coding-agent monitors, suggesting that current practices may under-elicit attacks and overstate monitor performance. We identify three challenges with current red-teaming. First, mode collapse in attack generation, which we reduce with a novel attack taxonomy for broader coverage. Second, a conceive-execute gap: frontier LLMs can propose strong attack ideas or execute them, but not all at once. We mitigate this by decomposing attack construction into strategy generation, execution, and post-hoc trajectory refinement. Third, manual elicitation is costly to scale, which we address with our semi-automated red-teaming pipeline. Applied to BashArena, an AI control setting for tool-using coding agents, this pipeline produces MonitoringBench, a benchmark of 2,644 attack trajectories for evaluating monitor capabilities and failure modes. Our pipeline produces more diverse and stronger attacks: Opus-4.5 monitor's catch rate falls from 94.9\% on elicited-only Opus attacks to 60.3\% on our best refined attacks, with larger drops for several mid-tier monitors. Attacks optimized against three development monitors generalize to ten held-out monitors, with catch rates generally increasing with monitor capability. Using this benchmark, we provide a snapshot of the current monitor capabilities and find that frontier monitors often detect suspicious actions but fall for persuasion or fail to calibrate suspiciousness scores appropriately, suggesting tractable paths for improvement. MonitoringBench provides both a static benchmark for current tool-use monitors and a reusable methodology for refreshing these evaluations as agents and monitors improve.

Tree-based speculative decoding verifies multiple draft continuations in one target-model pass, but finite trees built from draft scores face a fundamental draft-target mismatch. We ask whether better exact verification can increase acceptance on a fixed tree and how target feedback can improve the tree itself. Through a target-flow view, we identify a canonical exit law and prove that one plus target coverage sharply bounds the expected output-block length, including the bonus token, of any exact path verifier. All optimal verifiers share the same exit and bonus-token law, already attained by representative predraw-and-follow and sequential residual verifiers. This yields Tree Exit Verification (TEV), an exact, level-parallel procedure using one exit-node decision and one bonus-token decision. The exit law also identifies missing target probability, providing node-level feedback for Exit-Guided Draft-Tree Training (ExitTrain) on inference-time draft trees. Experiments across dialogue, code, and mathematical reasoning validate fixed-tree equivalence: ExitTrain increases average output-block length by 13%, while TEV reduces verifier-stage latency by 15%, yielding a 14% end-to-end speedup over DDTree. Our results distinguish two opportunities: better draft trees for higher acceptance and more direct verification for lower latency. Code: https://github.com/hsj576/TEV.

Model developers implement safeguards in frontier models to prevent misuse, for example, by employing classifiers to filter dangerous outputs. In this work, we demonstrate that even robustly safeguarded models can be used to elicit harmful capabilities in open-source models through elicitation attacks. Our elicitation attacks consist of three stages: (i) constructing prompts in adjacent domains to a target harmful task that do not request dangerous information; (ii) obtaining responses to these prompts from safeguarded frontier models; (iii) fine-tuning open-source models on these prompt-output pairs. Since the requested prompts cannot be used to directly cause harm, they are not refused by frontier model safeguards. We evaluate these elicitation attacks within the domain of hazardous chemical synthesis and processing, and demonstrate that our attacks recover approximately 40% of the capability gap between the base open-source model and an unrestricted frontier model. We then show that the efficacy of elicitation attacks scales with the capability of the frontier model and the amount of generated fine-tuning data. Our work demonstrates the challenge of mitigating ecosystem level risks with output-level safeguards.

LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.

Deploying large language models in user-facing systems requires efficient output safety filtering. Existing approaches typically rely on a separate moderation model applied after generation, which doubles inference cost and only detects violations after generation completes. We observe that the signal needed for moderation is already present in the model hidden states. Based on this, we train lightweight token-level probes that operate directly on internal activations, producing per-token safety scores that can be aggregated for both offline evaluation and online intervention. The probe reuses activations from the generator and requires no additional forward pass, enabling sub millisecond per-token safety checks inside the decoding loop. A probe applied to a single mid layer recovers most decisions of a strong guard model, acting as a low cost surrogate optimized for latency rather than accuracy. In streaming settings, it can halt or modify unsafe outputs before they are fully generated, replacing end of sequence moderation with continuous token level monitoring. Compared to post hoc and streaming guard models, our method achieves orders of magnitude lower compute overhead with minimal latency cost. We also provide a practical deployment recipe, including layer selection, aggregation strategy, probing frequency, and triggering thresholds. Finally, we show that the probe linear component corresponds to a direction in residual space, enabling both detection and activation steering at negligible cost.

Since autonomous coding agents generate complex behaviors at high-volume, we may want to use other LLMs to monitor actions to reduce the risk from dangerous misaligned behavior. To better understand the limitations of such monitors against the diverse attack strategies that a coding agent could use, we present SLEIGHT-Bench (Subtle Low-itEration Insight-Guided Harmful Transcripts), a benchmark of synthetic transcripts containing 40 attacks across 11 categories, each showing a coding agent covertly pursuing a harmful objective (e.g. weight exfiltration, credential theft, unmonitored rogue deployment). We find that 20 of 40 attacks are never caught by an Opus 4.6 monitor with extended thinking across 10 trials at a 1% false-positive rate, while the overall catch rate is 32%. We identify several evasion strategies such as exploiting model priors, user instruction ambiguity, and state manipulation, which facilitate creating attacks that evade frontier monitors. We also elicit stronger monitor performance using coding agents as monitors versus regular prompted monitors, and for some evasion strategies show improved catch rates with targeted monitor prompts. Our dataset and evaluation framework are available at https://github.com/safety-research/sleight-bench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/sleightbench/SLEIGHT-Bench.

Reasoning over heterogeneous artifacts (PDFs, spreadsheets, slide decks, etc.) increasingly occurs within structured agent workflows that iteratively extract, transform, and reference external information. In these workflows, uncertainty is not merely an input-quality issue: it can redirect decomposition and routing decisions, reshape intermediate state, and produce qualitatively different execution trajectories. We study this phenomenon by treating uncertainty as a controlled variable: we inject structured perturbations into artifact-derived representations, execute fixed workflows under comprehensive logging, and quantify contamination via trace divergence in plans, tool invocations, and intermediate state. Across 614 paired runs on 32 GAIA tasks with three different language models, we find a decoupling: workflows may diverge substantially yet recover correct answers, or remain structurally similar while producing incorrect outputs. We characterize three manifestation types: silent semantic corruption, behavioral detours with recovery, and combined structural disruption and their control-flow signatures (rerouting, extended execution, early termination). We measure operational costs and characterize why commonly used verification guardrails fail to intercept contamination. We contribute (i) a formal taxonomy of contamination manifestations in structured workflows, (ii) a trace-based measurement framework for detecting and localizing contamination across agent interactions, and (iii) empirical evidence with implications for targeted verification, defensive design, and cost control.

Deploying LLMs raises two coupled challenges: (1) monitoring - estimating where a model underperforms as traffic and domains drift - and (2) improvement - prioritizing data acquisition to close the largest performance gaps. We test whether an inference-time signal can estimate slice-level accuracy under domain shift. For each response, we compute an output-entropy profile from final-layer next-token probabilities (from top-k logprobs) and summarize it with eleven statistics. A lightweight classifier predicts instance correctness, and averaging predicted probabilities yields a domain-level accuracy estimate. We evaluate on ten STEM reasoning benchmarks with exhaustive train/test compositions (k in {1,2,3,4}; all "10 choose k" combinations), across nine LLMs from six families (3B-20B). Estimates often track held-out benchmark accuracy, and several models show near-monotonic ordering of domains. Output-entropy profiles are thus an accessible signal for scalable monitoring and for targeting data acquisition.

We consider the problem of language model inversion: given outputs of a language model, we seek to extract the prompt that generated these outputs. We develop a new black-box method, output2prompt, that learns to extract prompts without access to the model's logits and without adversarial or jailbreaking queries. In contrast to previous work, output2prompt only needs outputs of normal user queries. To improve memory efficiency, output2prompt employs a new sparse encoding techique. We measure the efficacy of output2prompt on a variety of user and system prompts and demonstrate zero-shot transferability across different LLMs.

Many papers have shown that attention heads work in conjunction with each other to perform complex tasks. It's frequently assumed that communication between attention heads is via the addition of specific features to token residuals. In this work we seek to isolate and identify the features used to effect communication and coordination among attention heads in GPT-2 small. Our key leverage on the problem is to show that these features are very often sparsely coded in the singular vectors of attention head matrices. We characterize the dimensionality and occurrence of these signals across the attention heads in GPT-2 small when used for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task. The sparse encoding of signals, as provided by attention head singular vectors, allows for efficient separation of signals from the residual background and straightforward identification of communication paths between attention heads. We explore the effectiveness of this approach by tracing portions of the circuits used in the IOI task. Our traces reveal considerable detail not present in previous studies, shedding light on the nature of redundant paths present in GPT-2. And our traces go beyond previous work by identifying features used to communicate between attention heads when performing IOI.

Intent-based network management automates 6G service lifecycles, but existing fulfilment and assurance approaches require traffic inspection, per-flow tracking, or vendor-internal telemetry. These requirements conflict with privacy constraints in multi-tenant networks and vendor opacity in O-RAN deployments. We present an architecture that provisions resources from declared intent categories without traffic inspection and verifies fulfilment using only cell-level standardised PM counters at the O1 interface. A data-processing inequality bounds resource-allocation leakage about traffic content by log_2 K bits for K categories. Intent-traffic unlinkability and node-opaque verification hold by construction. If verification requires at least q cells per category among M cells, the ceiling becomes log_2 lfloor M/q rfloor bits. This bound covers the category/resource channel, not total inference from PM counters. When individual records add state-independent noise to the category aggregate, the category-mean verifier is at least as powerful as any per-agent verifier. We map the architecture to the 3GPP intent lifecycle and O-RAN Non-RT RIC. On production PM data from four operator networks, the category-mean score has higher AUC on three networks and comparable AUC on the fourth under category-wide replacement, while per-cell screening suits sparse faults. These injection-based experiments do not establish the theorem's observation premise. Within-period cell co-movement limits a category mean to the evidence of 6 to 14 independent cells, and category-level verifiers need per-category calibration.

Continual instruction tuning updates a language model through a sequence of new domains, yet each update can progressively erode previously learned capabilities and alignment behavior. Replay is the standard mitigation, but fixed replay ratios are inherently limited because the optimal mixture varies with the current domain, the training stage, and the evolving vulnerability of prior behaviors. We propose PROX-YMIX, a framework that learns a dynamic replay controller on a small proxy model and transfers the frozen controller to a larger target. The controller never observes future tasks and constructs its state from normalized validation losses and their temporal dynamics, producing a masked mixture over the current task and accessible replay buffers. Our core empirical hypothesis is forgetting mirroring: task vulnerability rankings remain largely consistent across model scales even when absolute loss magnitudes differ. We validate this assumption empirically before transferring controllers across scales. On LLaMA-3-8B across five continual instruction tuning sequences, PROXYMIX improves average accuracy by 3.4 points, reduces final forgetting by 3.5 points, and raises safety score by 5.8 points over the strongest non-oracle baseline, at roughly 50x lower policy learning cost than Oracle Target RL. The framework is leakage free and architecture independent at the interface level, and we also identify settings where the proxy assumption breaks down, highlighting limitations for robust deployment.

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems create privacy risks that current benchmarks cannot measure. When agents coordinate on tasks, sensitive data passes through inter-agent messages, shared memory, and tool arguments; pathways that output-only audits never inspect. We introduce AgentLeak, to the best of our knowledge the first full-stack benchmark for privacy leakage covering internal channels, spanning 1,000 scenarios across healthcare, finance, legal, and corporate domains, paired with a 32-class attack taxonomy and three-tier detection pipeline. Testing GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mistral Large, and Llama 3.3 70B across 4,979 traces reveals that multi-agent configurations reduce per-channel output leakage (C1: 27.2% vs 43.2% in single-agent) but introduce unmonitored internal channels that raise total system exposure to 68.9% (OR-aggregated across C1, C2, C5). Internal channels account for most of this gap: inter-agent messages (C2) leak at 68.8%, compared to 27.2% on C1 (output channel). This means that output-only audits miss 41.7% of violations. Claude 3.5 Sonnet, which emphasizes safety alignment in its design, achieves the lowest leakage rates on both external (3.3%) and internal (28.1%) channels, suggesting that model-level safety training may transfer to internal channel protection. Across all five models and four domains, the pattern C2 > C1 holds consistently, confirming that inter-agent communication is the primary vulnerability. These findings underscore the need for coordination frameworks that incorporate internal-channel privacy protections and enforce privacy controls on inter-agent communication.

While Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) excel in complex reasoning, they suffer from the cascading impact of erroneous information generated by individual participants. Current solutions often resort to rigid structural engineering or expensive fine-tuning, limiting their deployability and adaptability. We propose AgentDropoutV2, a test-time rectify-or-reject pruning framework designed to dynamically optimize MAS information flow without retraining. Our approach acts as an active firewall, intercepting agent outputs and employing a retrieval-augmented rectifier to iteratively correct errors based on a failure-driven indicator pool. This mechanism allows for the precise identification of potential errors using distilled failure patterns as prior knowledge. Irreparable outputs are subsequently pruned to prevent error propagation, while a fallback strategy preserves system integrity. Empirical results on extensive math benchmarks show that AgentDropoutV2 significantly boosts the MAS's task performance, achieving an average accuracy gain of 6.3 percentage points on math benchmarks. Furthermore, the system exhibits robust generalization and adaptivity, dynamically modulating rectification efforts based on task difficulty while leveraging context-aware indicators to resolve a wide spectrum of error patterns. Our code and dataset are released at https://github.com/TonySY2/AgentDropoutV2.

The agent--tool interaction loop is a critical attack surface for modern Large Language Model (LLM) agents. Existing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks typically function at the user-prompt or retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) context layer and are inherently single-turn in nature. This limitation restricts cost amplification and diminishes stealth in goal-oriented workflows. To address these issues, we proposed a stealthy, multi-turn economic DoS attack at the tool layer under the Model Context Protocol (MCP). By simply editing text-visible fields and implementing a template-driven return policy, our malicious server preserves function signatures and the terminal benign payload while steering agents into prolonged, verbose tool-calling chains. We optimize these text-only edits with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to maximize cost under a task-success constraint. Across six LLMs on ToolBench and BFCL benchmarks, our attack yields trajectories over 60K tokens, increases per-query cost by up to 658 times, raises energy by 100 to 560 times, and pushes GPU key-value (KV) cache occupancy to 35--74%. Standard prompt filters and output trajectory monitors seldom detect these attacks, highlighting the need for defenses that safeguard agentic processes rather than focusing solely on final outcomes. We will release the code soon.

Grey-box fuzzers such as American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) are popular tools for finding bugs and potential vulnerabilities in programs. While these fuzzers have been able to find vulnerabilities in many widely used programs, they are not efficient; of the millions of inputs executed by AFL in a typical fuzzing run, only a handful discover unseen behavior or trigger a crash. The remaining inputs are redundant, exhibiting behavior that has already been observed. Here, we present an approach to increase the efficiency of fuzzers like AFL by applying machine learning to directly model how programs behave. We learn a forward prediction model that maps program inputs to execution traces, training on the thousands of inputs collected during standard fuzzing. This learned model guides exploration by focusing on fuzzing inputs on which our model is the most uncertain (measured via the entropy of the predicted execution trace distribution). By focusing on executing inputs our learned model is unsure about, and ignoring any input whose behavior our model is certain about, we show that we can significantly limit wasteful execution. Through testing our approach on a set of binaries released as part of the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge, we show that our approach is able to find a set of inputs that result in more code coverage and discovered crashes than baseline fuzzers with significantly fewer executions.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

Asynchronous monitoring, incident investigations, and compliance audits primarily rely on agent traces to reconstruct what happened. These analyses assume that LLM agents cannot tamper with their own execution traces. We show that local LLM agents such as Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, Open Code and Grok Build fail to enforce this boundary. All tested harnesses, except Muse Code, allowed agents to delete their traces when asked, without triggering monitor guardrails. We also validate that external attackers can exploit this gap to induce trace deletion. Finally, we show that trace tampering behavior emerges naturally in frontier models, when agents try to improve their rewards. We advise practitioners to ensure trace logging happens through an independent interception mechanism outside of the agent's control, preserving trace integrity even in cases of full host compromise. Overall, our findings identify a concrete failure of trace integrity in agent infrastructure which can be used to conceal misaligned behaviors like scheming or sabotage.

In this paper, we introduce a black-box prompt optimization method that uses an attacker LLM agent to uncover higher levels of memorization in a victim agent, compared to what is revealed by prompting the target model with the training data directly, which is the dominant approach of quantifying memorization in LLMs. We use an iterative rejection-sampling optimization process to find instruction-based prompts with two main characteristics: (1) minimal overlap with the training data to avoid presenting the solution directly to the model, and (2) maximal overlap between the victim model's output and the training data, aiming to induce the victim to spit out training data. We observe that our instruction-based prompts generate outputs with 23.7% higher overlap with training data compared to the baseline prefix-suffix measurements. Our findings show that (1) instruction-tuned models can expose pre-training data as much as their base-models, if not more so, (2) contexts other than the original training data can lead to leakage, and (3) using instructions proposed by other LLMs can open a new avenue of automated attacks that we should further study and explore. The code can be found at https://github.com/Alymostafa/Instruction_based_attack .

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

In this work, we take a fresh look at some old and new algorithms for off-policy, return-based reinforcement learning. Expressing these in a common form, we derive a novel algorithm, Retrace(λ), with three desired properties: (1) it has low variance; (2) it safely uses samples collected from any behaviour policy, whatever its degree of "off-policyness"; and (3) it is efficient as it makes the best use of samples collected from near on-policy behaviour policies. We analyze the contractive nature of the related operator under both off-policy policy evaluation and control settings and derive online sample-based algorithms. We believe this is the first return-based off-policy control algorithm converging a.s. to Q^* without the GLIE assumption (Greedy in the Limit with Infinite Exploration). As a corollary, we prove the convergence of Watkins' Q(λ), which was an open problem since 1989. We illustrate the benefits of Retrace(λ) on a standard suite of Atari 2600 games.

Large language models increasingly stream long, reasoning-intensive responses in real time, making when to moderate as critical as whether to moderate. Existing guardrails fall into two unsatisfactory extremes: response-level methods delay intervention until the full output is generated, whereas token-level methods act on incomplete semantics, often producing unstable decisions and excessive guard invocations. To address this challenge, we propose SentGuard, a sentence-level streaming guardrail that operates in parallel with generation. A lightweight waiting buffer groups streamed tokens into sentence chunks and releases only verified chunks to the user, introducing a small offset that enables SentGuard to assess the current prefix while the target LLM decodes subsequent content. To support this, we construct StreamSafe, a benchmark with structured per-sentence annotations across 8 harm categories, capturing the evolution of safety risks across both reasoning and response segments. We further train SentGuard with a coarse-to-fine objective to detect unsafe intent as soon as it emerges at sentence boundaries. Experiments on 5 safety benchmarks show that SentGuard outperforms existing baselines, detecting 90.5% of unsafe cases within two sentences while maintaining a low streaming false-positive rate of 7.41%.

Computer-use agents pay full frontier inference to re-derive routines their user has already performed, because an agent's memory today records what the user said, not what the user did. We compile passively captured screen activity into agent memory with a deterministic, zero-model pipeline: it segments a local capture stream into typed activity frames, bounded episodes carrying application, site, timing, input volume, and evidence pointers back to the raw rows, with no model in the loop, so the output is byte-identical, cacheable, and mechanically auditable. On one professional's single-user corpus of 128,756 frames over 51 active days, the compiler reduces a day of raw capture to a prompt-ready context block 86x smaller in 68 ms, and an agent reading that block answers questions about the day at 98.4% accuracy (Wilson 95% CI 91.7-99.7%) against an independent oracle, versus 66-80% for an LLM summary of the same capture, a mid-tier model reading the block matching a frontier one. The same compiler doubles as a demand-side cost instrument. Read off passive, pre-delegation human activity rather than agent rollouts, it supplies two parameters that agent-cost models assume but, to our knowledge, have not measured: the Routine Overhead Ratio R and the routine recurrence h. We report first values of R, a modeled upper bound, at 60-343x, and a delegable recurrence of 9.0% in-sample and 7.7% out-of-sample, for a realistic all-fleet token ceiling near 8%; a compiled routine replays deterministically with the model out of the loop, demonstrated live at zero model tokens on a guard-matched hit. Schema, compiler, and evaluation harness are open.

Deploying LLMs in multi-turn dialogues facilitates jailbreak attacks that distribute harmful intent across seemingly benign turns. Recent training-based multi-turn jailbreak methods learn long-horizon attack strategies from interaction feedback, but often rely on coarse trajectory-level outcome signals that broadcast uniformly to every turn. However, we find that turn-level contributions in multi-turn jailbreaking are non-uniform, phase-dependent, and target-specific. Such coarse outcome supervision induces a credit assignment problem, leading to over-rewarding redundant turns in successful trajectories and under-crediting useful intermediate turns in failed ones. To address this, we propose TRACE, a turn-aware credit assignment framework for reinforcement learning (RL)-based multi-turn jailbreaking. For successful trajectories, TRACE estimates turn-level contributions via leave-one-turn-out semantic masking; for failed ones, TRACE assigns penalties based on prompt harmfulness and semantic relevance, with an additional local refusal-aware penalty. Furthermore, we reuse the attack-side credit signal for multi-turn defense alignment. Extensive experiments on open-source and closed-source targets show that TRACE achieves strong overall performance in effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency, yielding about a 25% relative improvement in attack success rate over the strongest RL baseline while also improving the safety-utility balance when reused for defense alignment.

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

As AI agents increasingly act through external tools, tool results are no longer simple outputs but execution artifacts that must remain correctly associated with the context that produced them. Yet as results persist across caches, recovery mechanisms, and shared runtime state, this association can break, causing a real and unmodified result to be consumed in an incompatible execution context and lead the agent to an unsafe action. We characterize this failure as tool-result misbinding. To systematically study this failure, we introduce ReplayBench, a benchmark that uses controlled tool-result replay to evaluate misbinding across 19 representative agent scenarios, 4 failure properties, and 3 replay mechanisms. Across eight LLMs, three agent frameworks, and diverse stateful workflows, we find widespread replay-induced failures, with a mean Final-State Error Rate of 0.649 under cross-task replay. Stage-wise analysis localizes these failures to model-side action generation. Further analyses show that replay susceptibility varies with task similarity, shows little dependence on object similarity, and remains high under result staleness and implicit environment changes. These findings motivate runtime validity mechanisms that eliminate final-state errors in our evaluated settings while preserving legitimate recovery. The results call for explicit contextual binding in tool-using agent runtimes. Our work is public at https://github.com/Phitooo/Replaybench.

Large Language Model based agents increasingly operate in high stakes, multi turn settings where factual grounding is critical, yet their memory systems typically rely on flat key value stores or plain vector retrieval with no mechanism to track the provenance or trustworthiness of stored knowledge. We present ElephantBroker, an open source cognitive runtime that unifies a Neo4j knowledge graph with a Qdrant vector store through the Cognee SDK to provide durable, verifiable agent memory. The system implements a complete cognitive loop (store, retrieve, score, compose, protect, learn) comprising a hybrid five source retrieval pipeline, an eleven dimension competitive scoring engine for budget constrained context assembly, a four state evidence verification model, a five stage context lifecycle with goal aware assembly and continuous compaction, a six layer cheap first guard pipeline for safety enforcement, an AI firewall providing enforceable tool call interception and multi tier safety scanning, a nine stage consolidation engine that strengthens useful patterns while decaying noise, and a numeric authority model governing multi organization identity with hierarchical access control. Architectural validation through a comprehensive test suite of over 2,200 tests spanning unit, integration, and end to end levels confirms subsystem correctness. The modular design supports three deployment tiers, five profile presets with inheritance, multi gateway isolation, and a management dashboard for human oversight, enabling configurations from lightweight memory only agents to full cognitive runtimes with enterprise grade safety and auditability.

In the realm of large language models (LLMs), the ability of models to accurately follow instructions is paramount as more agents and applications leverage LLMs for construction, where the complexity of instructions are rapidly increasing. However, on the one hand, there is only a certain amount of complex instruction evaluation data; on the other hand, there are no dedicated algorithms to improve the ability to follow complex instructions. To this end, this paper introduces TRACE, a benchmark for improving and evaluating the complex instructionfollowing ability, which consists of 120K training data and 1K evaluation data. Furthermore, we propose IOPO (Input-Output Preference Optimization) alignment method which takes both input and output preference pairs into consideration, where LLMs not only rapidly align with response preferences but also meticulously explore the instruction preferences. Extensive experiments on both in-domain and outof-domain datasets confirm the effectiveness of IOPO, showing 8.15%, 2.18% improvements on in-domain data and 6.29%, 3.13% on outof-domain data compared to SFT and DPO respectively.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

Model extraction is a growing concern for the security of AI systems. For deep neural network models, the architecture is the most important information an adversary aims to recover. Being a sequence of repeated computation blocks, neural network models deployed on edge-devices will generate distinctive side-channel leakages. The latter can be exploited to extract critical information when targeted platforms are physically accessible. By combining theoretical knowledge about deep learning practices and analysis of a widespread implementation library (ARM CMSIS-NN), our purpose is to answer this critical question: how far can we extract architecture information by simply examining an EM side-channel trace? For the first time, we propose an extraction methodology for traditional MLP and CNN models running on a high-end 32-bit microcontroller (Cortex-M7) that relies only on simple pattern recognition analysis. Despite few challenging cases, we claim that, contrary to parameters extraction, the complexity of the attack is relatively low and we highlight the urgent need for practicable protections that could fit the strong memory and latency requirements of such platforms.

The residual stream mediates communication between transformer decoder layers via linear reads and writes of non-linear computations. While sparse-dictionary learning-based methods locate features in the residual stream, and activation patching methods discover circuits within the model, the mechanism by which features flow through the residual stream remains understudied. Understanding this dynamic can better inform jailbreaking protections, enable early detection of model mistakes, and their correction. In this work, we propose Activation Transport Operators (ATO), linear maps from upstream to downstream residuals k layers later, evaluated in feature space using downstream SAE decoder projections. We empirically demonstrate that these operators can determine whether a feature has been linearly transported from a previous layer or synthesised from non-linear layer computation. We develop the notion of transport efficiency, for which we provide an upper bound, and use it to estimate the size of the residual stream subspace that corresponds to linear transport. We empirically demonstrate the linear transport, report transport efficiency and the size of the residual stream's subspace involved in linear transport. This compute-light (no finetuning, <50 GPU-h) method offers practical tools for safety, debugging, and a clearer picture of where computation in LLMs behaves linearly.

Long-running LLM agents are stateful: beyond the transcript they accrete compressed summaries, plaintext memory, pending tool plans, and, under every serving API, a KV cache. Yet today's "forget" operations delete a plaintext memory record and stop, leaving every artifact derived from the revoked information intact. We formalize execution-state unlearning: after a forget request, the agent must behave as if it had never observed the target. Modeling the runtime as a deterministic transition system, we prove that the pre-target trajectory prefix is shared with this counterfactual world for free, that the post-target suffix is irreducibly tainted without token-level attribution, and that exact unlearning requires at least T-τ+1 recomputed transitions, where τ is the target's injection step. Provenance-Guided Selective Replay attains this bound as a cross-layer contract spanning prompt, compressed memory, and cache: a provenance graph locates the injection point, checkpoint restoration reduces to cropping the KV cache, and sanitized replay regenerates the counterfactual suffix. Audited with elicitation, stochastic, and string-free behavioral tests across three agent suites, nine baselines, and three model families, memory deletion leaves leakage unchanged, instruction-based forgetting collapses under elicitation (Leak@probes = 1.00), and source redaction still acts on a revoked preference in 80% of episodes, while selective replay is indistinguishable from a full reset at up to 9x fewer recomputed tokens.

Language-model agents increasingly use tools to act on external systems. Earlier actions can alter files, permissions, database records, or other state, making a later routine-looking action harmful. Yet the visible interaction may not reveal the underlying state needed to assess that action. We formulate attack and defense as partially observed state control in SEAD, deriving their design requirements from this shared execution process. Because attackers supply instructions while the target chooses concrete actions, DART decomposes harmful goals into locally plausible steps and uses feedback from actual tool execution to guide trajectory search. The defender must decide before execution with incomplete state evidence. SAGE can therefore investigate relevant state through read-only queries before allowing or blocking each action, including those proposed after a block. We construct an environment-verifiable dataset integrating controlled initial states, replayable tool environments, and task-specific executable checks. Across four target models, DART improves semantic attack success by 18.8--35.9 percentage points over the competing baseline, with consistent gains under executable verification. On recorded trajectories, SAGE preserves 95.79% of benign trajectories while intercepting 92.73% of harmful paths by the harm-enabling boundary. In online attack-defense evaluation, it reduces DART's executable attack success from 48.0% to 4.0%. SAGE remains effective across four attack methods and generalizes to out-of-domain environments. Our code and data is available at https://github.com/EverywhereSafety/SEAD.

Tool use enables large language models to solve complex tasks through sequences of API calls, yet existing reinforcement learning approaches fail to scale to multi-step composition settings. Outcome-based rewards provide only sparse feedback, while trajectory-supervised rewards depend on annotated reference solutions, penalizing valid alternatives and limiting scalability. We propose TIER: Trajectory-Invariant Execution Rewards, a reward framework that derives supervision directly from function schemas and runtime execution, rather than from reference trajectories. The reward decomposes into format validity, schema adherence, execution success, and answer correctness, providing dense, interpretable sequence-level feedback derived from fine-grained verification of individual steps of tool use. This design allows any valid execution path to receive credit, naturally supporting multiple solution strategies and adapting to evolving tool interfaces. On DepthBench, a compositional benchmark stratified by depth (1 to 6 steps), TIER achieves >90% accuracy across steps, where trajectory-supervised rewards collapse beyond step-4. We further demonstrate consistent gains on benchmarks like BFCL v3 and NestFUL. Ablation studies confirm that all reward components are necessary, highlighting the importance of multi-level supervision for compositional reasoning.

Some security-development settings require local models that map an objective to an ordered, checkable plan. We present a low-rank decomposition adapter and release a case-disjoint corpus with 24 authored decompositions and 83 derived next-step examples across 24 satellite-security cases. To prevent reference-plan leakage, prompts contain one objective and eight shuffled SPARTA candidates. The evaluation candidate sets are constructed with oracle inclusion of every reference technique, so this study measures selection from a controlled set, not retrieval. On six fixed cases and five decoding seeds, mean scores vary across adapters and prompted Qwen2.5 baselines; a separate greedy check over three adapter training seeds shows non-negligible training variance. A 24-fold greedy leave-one-case-out control at the two compact sizes likewise shows tradeoffs: at 1.5B, adapter precision is 0.583 against 0.480 for two-shot prompting, while recall is 0.586 against 0.660. Case-resampling intervals for adapter precision relative to the strongest prompted baseline cross zero at 1.5B and 7B. The adapter is also substantially more format-compliant, which prevents attributing all score differences to selection. Autoregressive next-step accuracy is 0.08, 0.06, and 0.29 at 0.5B, 1.5B, and 7B. We therefore offer the formulation, leakage-controlled dataset, reproducibility package, and descriptive analysis as a proof of concept, not evidence of a reliable stand-alone decomposition system or a general adapter advantage. A separate diagnostic tests contract reuse.

Instruction tuning is now the default way to train and adapt large language models, but many instruction--input--output pairs are only weakly specified: for a given input, the same output can remain plausible under several alternative instructions. This raises a simple question: does the instruction uniquely determine the target output? We propose the Task--Specificity Score (TSS) to quantify how much an instruction matters for predicting its output, by contrasting the true instruction against plausible alternatives for the same input. We further introduce TSS++, which uses hard alternatives and a small quality term to mitigate easy-negative effects. Across three instruction datasets (Alpaca, Dolly-15k, NI-20) and three open LLMs (Gemma, Llama, Qwen), we show that selecting task-specific examples improves downstream performance under tight token budgets and complements quality-based filters such as perplexity and IFD.

Modern coding agents increasingly delegate specialized subtasks to subagents, which are smaller, focused agentic loops that handle narrow responsibilities like search, debugging or terminal execution. This architectural pattern keeps the main agent's context window clean by isolating verbose outputs (e.g. build logs, test results, etc.) within the subagent context. Typically when agents employ subagents for such tasks, they use frontier models as these subagents. In this paper, we investigate whether a finetuned small language model (SLM) can achieve comparable performance to frontier models in the task of agentic terminal execution. We present Terminus-4B, which is a post-trained Qwen3-4B model via Supervised Finetuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) using rubric-based LLM-as-judge reward, specifically for this task. In our extensive evaluation spanning various frontier models, training ablations and main agent configurations, we find that Terminus-4B is able to reduce the token usage of the main agent by up to ~30% compared to the No Subagent baseline with no impact to agent performance on benchmarks like SWE-Bench Pro and our internal SWE-Bench C# benchmark, which tends to be heavy in verbose execution tasks. Furthermore, Terminus-4B improves key metrics showing the main agent relying on the outputs of the subagent and doing fewer terminal execution tasks by itself. We see that our model not only closes the gap between the Vanilla Qwen model and frontier models like Claude Sonnet / Opus / GPT-5.3-Codex, but often even exceeds their performance.

Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can lead to unwanted side effects. We propose self-incrimination training, which instead trains agents to produce a visible signal when they covertly misbehave. We train GPT-4.1 and Gemini-2.0 agents to call a report_scheming() tool when behaving deceptively and measure their ability to cause harm undetected in out-of-distribution environments. Self-incrimination significantly reduces the undetected successful attack rate, outperforming matched-capability monitors and alignment baselines while preserving instruction hierarchy and incurring minimal safety tax on general capabilities. Unlike blackbox monitoring, self-incrimination performance is consistent across tasks regardless of how suspicious the misbehavior appears externally. The trained behavior persists under adversarial prompt optimization and generalizes to settings where agents pursue misaligned goals themselves rather than being instructed to misbehave. Our results suggest self-incrimination offers a viable path for reducing frontier misalignment risk, one that neither assumes misbehavior can be prevented nor that it can be reliably classified from the outside.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

System Instructions in Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly used to enforce safety policies, define agent behavior, and protect sensitive operational context in agentic AI applications. These instructions may contain sensitive information such as API credentials, internal policies, and privileged workflow definitions, making system instruction leakage a critical security risk highlighted in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications. Without incurring the overhead costs of reasoning models, many LLM applications rely on refusal-based instructions that block direct requests for system instructions, implicitly assuming that prohibited information can only be extracted through explicit queries. We introduce an automated evaluation framework that tests whether system instructions remain confidential when extraction requests are re-framed as encoding or structured output tasks. Across seven common models and 46 verified system instructions, we observe high attack success rates (>0.7) for structured serialization where models refuse direct extraction requests but disclose protected content in the requested serialization formats. We further demonstrate a mitigation strategy based on one-shot instruction reshaping using a Chain-of-Thought reasoning model, indicating that even subtle changes in wording and structure of system instructions can significantly reduce attack success rate without requiring model retraining.

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

Asynchronous reinforcement learning (RL) for large language model (LLM) agents trains one policy on trajectories generated by another: rollouts come from stale checkpoints, and the inference engine's probabilities differ from the trainer's even at identical parameters. Standard remedies either clip importance ratios, which biases the update, or, as in GRPO, sample a group of responses per prompt, which is costly when episodes are long. We propose KL-Regularized Policy Optimization (KLPO), a framework that anchors the KL regularizer at the sampler. The regularized improvement step then has a closed-form Gibbs solution, and KLPO fits its log-ratio optimality condition by least squares on the sampler's own trajectories, so the sampler probability enters through a log-ratio and no importance weights are needed. Profiling out the regression intercept replaces the intractable log-partition function with the signal's sampler mean plus a sampler-to-trainer KL divergence. For token-level policy mirror descent targets, we show that the resulting gradient can be computed from terminal returns without a critic, via sampler-centered scores or a single trajectory residual, even under stochastic tool outputs. We further prove that independent Monte Carlo estimates of the KL term keep these gradients unbiased, derive the exact KL gap of cheaper top-K and binary approximations, and show that SPPO, GPO, REBEL, and BPO arise as special cases of KLPO. The result is a critic-free update that uses one rollout per prompt and requires neither a learned normalizer nor a group of responses.

Looped Transformers increase test-time computation by repeatedly applying a shared recurrent block. Learned halting objectives in looped Transformers typically use a single exit distribution both as the inference-time stopping rule and as the training-time weighting of per-depth losses. This entangles exit selection with trajectory formation: the gate not only chooses which recurrent state to use, but also determines how strongly each intermediate state is supervised. Consequently, poor adaptive-compute performance can arise from the readout, the induced trajectory, or their interaction. We study adaptive depth in looped Transformers through this trajectory--readout lens, across controlled synthetic tasks (modular arithmetic and binary parity) and large-scale Ouro-1.4B and 2.6B checkpoints. We find that fixed-prior depth supervision, which shapes the trajectory without an input-dependent halting policy, produces difficulty-aware trajectories whose intermediate states expose useful stopping signals, and that simple post-hoc confidence readouts often match or outperform learned linear and MLP gates. Fitting gates on frozen trajectories localizes the failure: it appears to stem mainly from the trajectory induced by joint gate training rather than from limited gate expressivity. The same pattern is present in Ouro evaluations, where pretrained ponder gates are competitive but not uniformly Pareto-optimal, and measured latency confirms that the resulting reductions in average exit depth translate into practical inference-time savings. Our systematic diagnostic evaluation reframes adaptive depth in looped Transformers as a joint problem of trajectory formation and exit readout, rather than gate learning alone, highlighting a distinction that prior learned-halting work has often left implicit.

Coding agents repeatedly consume long tool observations even though only a small fraction of each observation matters for the next step. We study task-conditioned tool-output pruning: given a focused query and one tool output, return the smallest verbatim evidence block the agent should inspect next. We introduce a benchmark of 11,477 examples built from SWE-bench repository interactions and synthetic multi-ecosystem tool outputs, with a manually curated 618-example test set. We fine-tune Qwen 3.5 2B with LoRA and compare it against larger zero-shot models and heuristic pruning baselines. Our model reaches 0.86 recall and 0.80 F1 while removing 92% of input tokens, outperforming zero-shot Qwen 3.5 35B A3B by 11 recall points and all heuristic baselines by a wide margin.

A selector that allocates work across opaque components must evaluate them without being told how they performed. We study the least communication that suffices. Each parent maintains an allocation vector over its children and updates it from outcomes by proportional redistribution. Each child reads the sign of its own allocation change, one bit per round it is selected, so no evaluation message crosses the parent-child boundary. (1) The update preserves the simplex with strict positivity. (2) Conditional on being selected, a child's sign is exactly the root outcome at every depth, a sufficient statistic. The conditioning is necessary. (3) Under interiority a single selector has a unique interior equilibrium, exact and closed-form for N=2, with almost sure convergence under decreasing steps. For general N an equi-ratio condition gives an explicit affine equilibrium. (4) The linearised mean flow has real, strictly negative tangent eigenvalues with explicit bounds for all N >= 2. (5) The mean flow converges globally. An explicit potential, up to normalisation the KL divergence between the failure and slack distributions, decreases at a rate equal to the variance of the equi-ratio statistic. Without interiority the rule drops exactly the children below the surviving support's threshold. (6) The update law composes along a single active path, since ancestors select a node's active rounds but do not alter a realised signal. No joint convergence theorem for a hierarchy whose levels adapt simultaneously is claimed. (7) The one-bit interface admits exactly four deterministic memoryless distortions, and at a single selector passing the bit on unchanged delivers strictly higher mean quality upward than negation or constant transmission. Illustrations on synthetic hierarchies up to 16,384 leaves and three real datasets (3.4 billion comparisons, no mismatches) are consistent with the theory.

The optimization of long-horizon agents increasingly relies on reflection-based mechanisms, where a large language model (LLM) acts as an optimizer to diagnose agent failures and improve agent policies. However, real execution traces are difficult to use directly for optimization: large trace collections are often redundant and heterogeneous, making optimization inefficient and prone to overfitting to low-value failures; meanwhile, each individual trajectory also contains many irrelevant steps, while naive context reduction methods such as truncation or sliding windows can discard causally important evidence and produce misleading optimization signals. To resolve this dilemma, we introduce STRACE (Structural TRajectory Analysis and Causal Extraction), a framework that constructs high signal-noise optimization contexts for more precise and effective optimization. At the batch level, STRACE mines failure patterns to filter redundant traces and retain representative failures; within each selected trace, it performs causal localization over a textual dependency graph to remove non-causal steps and identify the true root-cause module for optimization. Empirical results demonstrate that STRACE significantly outperforms standard context-filtering baselines. Notably, on a challenging formal verification task (VeruSAGE-Bench), it successfully optimizes human-expert designed agents, delivering 1.4times success-rate improvement (42.5% to 58.5%). The code is available at https://github.com/moomight/STRACE .

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not. We argue that this binary attack-success rate discards the information a defender most needs, namely how harmful the resulting action was. We introduce an action-graded harm rubric that scores an agent's tool-call trajectory on a seven-level ordinal scale (L0 to L6) according to whether the executed action was reversible, whether it crossed scope to reach another party, and whether it expanded privilege. We compute the scale two ways: a deterministic oracle that reads the trajectory and the attacker's stated goal, and a panel of three frontier language-model judges that read a tag-free account of the same trajectory. Across four victim models and two defenses on the AgentDojo workspace suite, severity grading exposes three cases the binary metric hides, including a defense that reports a zero attack-success rate while still permitting an externally visible cross-scope leak through an unfiltered tool. The judge panel reproduces the oracle with high ordinal agreement (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.91) but shares systematic blind spots that we characterize, most notably a failure to recognize escalation chains. Unlike prior work that provides harm taxonomies, harmful-task completion tests, execution-level safety benchmarks, or severity-aware simulation, our contribution is a reusable, trace-grounded severity instrument applied to the actual actions recorded in existing red-team logs. All code, prompts, and per-episode logs are released.

Circuit extraction identifies a small set of model components whose presence preserves a target behavior under ablation, and the resulting circuit is often read as the mechanism behind that behavior. We argue that this reading is under-determined: preserving behavior does not single out one circuit, because the claim it supports depends on which circuit is reported and how two circuits are compared. We make this concrete in a synthetic Lean tactic-prediction benchmark -- predicting the next step of a proof -- where fixed proof rules with randomized surface form let differences between extracted circuits be attributed to these choices rather than to the task. Across dense and weight-sparse checkpoints (most weights constrained to zero) of the same transformer, evaluated on atomic (single-rule) and compositional (multi-rule) proofs, we vary which extracted object is reported (a compact prediction-preserving circuit, a broader graph that also keeps surrounding read, write, and routing structure, or the smallest subgraph meeting a post-ablation loss threshold), and whether each attention head's query and key are represented jointly or separately. Exact component-to-component edge overlap is low and sensitive to these choices, at times dropping to a random baseline, while two coarser summaries stay stable: the set of selected attention heads, and the circuit-size ranking of conditions that differ in which supervised checkpoint initializes reinforcement learning (RL). The largest accuracy gains from RL on compositional proofs come with the most structure beyond the atomic circuits. A circuit-level claim is therefore well defined only once one states which circuit is reported, the pruning threshold used to extract it, and the level at which circuits are compared. We distill these requirements into a reporting practice for circuit-extraction studies.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by payload generation strategies (heuristic vs. optimization) and defenses by intervention stages (text, model, and execution levels). Our analysis reveals a key limitation shared by many existing defenses and benchmarks: they largely overlook context-dependent tasks, in which agents are authorized to rely on runtime environmental observations to determine actions. To address this gap, we introduce AgentPI, a new benchmark designed to systematically evaluate agent behavior under context-dependent interaction settings. Using AgentPI, we empirically evaluate representative defenses and show that no single approach can simultaneously achieve high trustworthiness, high utility, and low latency. Moreover, we show that many defenses appear effective under existing benchmarks by suppressing contextual inputs, yet fail to generalize to realistic agent settings where context-dependent reasoning is essential. This SoK distills key takeaways and open research problems, offering structured guidance for future research and practical deployment of secure LLM agents.

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.

Understanding the dynamic behavior of computer programs during normal working conditions is an important task, which has multiple security benefits such as the development of behavior-based anomaly detection, vulnerability discovery, and patching. Existing works achieved this goal by collecting and analyzing various data including network traffic, system calls, instruction traces, etc. In this paper, we explore the use of a new type of data, performance counters, to analyze the dynamic behavior of programs. Using existing primitives, we develop a tool named perfextract to capture data from different performance counters for a program during its startup time, thus forming multiple time series to represent the dynamic behavior of the program. We analyze the collected data and develop a semi-supervised clustering algorithm that allows us to classify each program using its performance counter time series into a specific group and to identify the intrinsic behavior of that group. We carry out extensive experiments with 18 real-world programs that belong to 4 groups including web browsers, text editors, image viewers, and audio players. The experimental results show that the examined programs can be accurately differentiated based on their performance counter data regardless of whether programs are run in physical or virtual environments.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

We study the accuracy of differentially private mechanisms in the continual release model. A continual release mechanism receives a sensitive dataset as a stream of T inputs and produces, after receiving each input, an accurate output on the obtained inputs. In contrast, a batch algorithm receives the data as one batch and produces a single output. We provide the first strong lower bounds on the error of continual release mechanisms. In particular, for two fundamental problems that are widely studied and used in the batch model, we show that the worst case error of every continual release algorithm is tilde Omega(T^{1/3}) times larger than that of the best batch algorithm. Previous work shows only a polylogarithimic (in T) gap between the worst case error achievable in these two models; further, for many problems, including the summation of binary attributes, the polylogarithmic gap is tight (Dwork et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2010). Our results show that problems closely related to summation -- specifically, those that require selecting the largest of a set of sums -- are fundamentally harder in the continual release model than in the batch model. Our lower bounds assume only that privacy holds for streams fixed in advance (the "nonadaptive" setting). However, we provide matching upper bounds that hold in a model where privacy is required even for adaptively selected streams. This model may be of independent interest.

As models scale, reward hacking becomes more frequent, more sophisticated, and more consequential. Does it leave a telltale signature in model representations? This work analyzes how reward hacking is represented internally in frontier open source LLMs, and how those representations can be used to understand and discover the range of hacking behaviors a model displays. In particular, we find that simple difference of means vectors coherently represent reward hacking in Kimi K3, GLM 5.2, and Qwen 3.8 Max across a variety of behaviors in common evaluations. Despite their simplicity, these vectors are both generalizable and interpretable, and we can use them to reliably detect reward hacking. We first evaluate reward hacking in commonly reported benchmarks like DeepSWE and SWE-bench, finding that models reward hack excessively in these environments; GLM 5.2 hacks in 57.2% of rollouts on DeepSWE and in 73% of rollouts on SWE-bench. Catching these requires monitors; LLM monitors are effective, but expensive detectors. We show that DoM vectors are similarly effective but virtually free, catching 3.1% more hacks in Kimi K3 and 7.9% fewer hacks in GLM 5.2 on DeepSWE at a monitor matched false positive rate. DoM vectors run on the chain-of-thought also predict reward hacks in the model's subsequent actions, meaning we can run them online and catch potential hacks before they occur. Finally, we analyze probe-hits that LLM monitors do not catch and discover other undesirable behaviors, as well as show transfer to finding hacks in non-SWE evaluations. Together, these results provide evidence that simple, white-box methods can be used to scalably study and monitor reward hacking behaviors in frontier open source models

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Intermediate Representations (IRs) play a critical role in compiler design and program analysis, yet their comprehension by Large Language Models (LLMs) remains underexplored. In this paper, we present an explorative empirical study evaluating the capabilities of six state-of-the-art LLMs: GPT-4, GPT-3, DeepSeek, Gemma 2, Llama 3, and Code Llama, in understanding IRs. Specifically, we assess model performance across four core tasks: control flow graph reconstruction, decompilation, code summarization, and execution reasoning. While LLMs exhibit competence in parsing IR syntax and identifying high-level structures, they consistently struggle with instruction-level reasoning, especially in control flow reasoning, loop handling, and dynamic execution. Common failure modes include misinterpreting branching instructions, omitting critical operations, and relying on heuristic reasoning rather than precise instruction-level logic. Our findings highlight the need for IR-specific enhancements in LLM design. We recommend fine-tuning on structured IR datasets and integrating control-flow-sensitive architectures to improve model effectiveness. All experimental data and source code are publicly available at

Multi-agent LLM systems commonly use an orchestrator to decompose a task for a team of workers and then improve through textual reflection. Despite strong empirical results, these systems lack a unified account of coordination, memory improvement, and the role of external verification. We model orchestrator-worker interaction as a bilevel coordination game: under bounded coupling, the workers' local-update game is an approximate potential game whose equilibrium slack is controlled by decomposition quality. We then analyse reflection as stochastic movement over semantic memory states. For free-form reflection, we derive a finite-time upper bound, prove worst-case tightness, and give a positive lower bound under a falsifiable persistent-harm condition. We further prove an information-theoretic impossibility result: no gate that observes only the generated transcript can improve uniformly over text-indistinguishable environments, whereas an environment-grounded gate can. Motivated by this separation, we introduce Stochastic Reflective Memory Ascent (SRMA), which accepts a candidate memory only after a grounded evaluation risk strictly decreases. Under calibration and non-degenerate corrective mass, SRMA converges exactly, geometrically or polynomially; matching constructions show that both rate regimes are order-tight. We also provide confidence gating for stochastic evaluation and re-anchoring guarantees for piecewise-stationary environments. Experiments instantiate these objects with environment-grounded metrics and test the predicted coordination and drift laws. On 500 SWE-bench instances, the complete Kimi-based system resolves 72.2% versus a 70.8% public mini-SWE-agent reference. Code: https://github.com/YihangChen9/Bilevel-Coordinated-Reflection

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively, prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

Retrieving objects from dense clutter requires rearrangement during which the manipulator can occlude objects while moving them. Repeated arm withdrawals to restore visibility interrupt execution. We introduce TRACE, a plan-conditioned imitation framework for retrieval under self-occlusion. A single unoccluded observation initializes a digital twin, where a privileged teacher generates a fixed nominal rollout. A recurrent student combines local rollout context, partial object observations, and proprioception to select actions that can correct deviations from the prediction. Behavior cloning initializes the student; DAgger refines it with teacher labels on student-visited states. The rollout remains fixed throughout execution, so the deployed student needs neither online teacher queries nor additional simulator rollouts during pushing. On 511 simulation test scenes, TRACE achieves 90.7% success versus 43.4% for nominal replay and 96.7% for the privileged closed-loop teacher. At a matched 26,373-label budget, student-state supervision achieves 87.8% versus 66.7% for expert-only cloning, demonstrating gains beyond additional labels. On a UR5e, TRACE achieves 90.0% success versus 95.0% for the closed-loop teacher, while reducing total execution time from 192.7 s to 67.3 s. It avoids the teacher's 16.8 sensing-related arm retractions per trial during pushing, retaining a final withdrawal for graspability evaluation. Code and data will be released at: https://trace-retrieval.github.io.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Autonomous LLM agents can pursue hidden malicious objectives through sequences of individually benign actions, making sabotage difficult to detect using standard trajectory-level monitoring. Existing approaches either evaluate complete trajectories in a single pass or partition them into independently scored windows, limiting their ability to connect evidence across temporally distant actions. We propose TRACE, a monitoring framework for long-horizon LLM agent trajectories. TRACE operates through a TIJ (Triage-Inspect-Judge) loop that identifies high-signal regions, performs targeted inspection while maintaining accumulated evidence across reasoning steps, and synthesizes a trajectory-level verdict. We evaluate TRACE on ten task domains from SHADE-Arena against state-of-the-art baselines. TRACE achieves an aggregate F1 of 0.713 and recall of 0.844, with the largest gains on tasks requiring long-range evidence linking.

Adaptive hierarchical systems accumulate routing state as they learn which components to select. We show that this state already defines a coherent attribution over the hierarchy. A leaf receives the product of the local routing weights on its path, while an internal node receives the corresponding prefix product. The same learned state can therefore be read consistently at group and component levels, and every finer readout sums exactly to its coarser counterpart. This attribution describes the preferences learned by the deployed router rather than an intrinsic or counterfactual value of a component. Across LLM, Census, agentic, and telecom-network hierarchies, the learned state contains meaningful structure at several levels, and the clearest organisation need not occur at the leaves. In the telecom study, Site- or Region-level readouts usually reveal clearer structure than Cell-level readouts. Comparison with Shapley attribution can then show whether the preferences learned in deployment match capabilities revealed by counterfactual coalitions. The result is a hierarchical explanation that requires no separate attribution model: the same routing state supports consistent explanations at several levels of the system.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

We study a class of optimization problems motivated by automating the design and update of AI systems like coding assistants, robots, and copilots. We propose an end-to-end optimization framework, Trace, which treats the computational workflow of an AI system as a graph akin to neural networks, based on a generalization of back-propagation. Optimization of computational workflows often involves rich feedback (e.g. console output or user's responses), heterogeneous parameters (e.g. prompts, hyper-parameters, codes), and intricate objectives (beyond maximizing a score). Moreover, its computation graph can change dynamically with the inputs and parameters. We frame a new mathematical setup of iterative optimization, Optimization with Trace Oracle (OPTO), to capture and abstract these properties so as to design optimizers that work across many domains. In OPTO, an optimizer receives an execution trace along with feedback on the computed output and updates parameters iteratively. Trace is the tool to implement OPTO in practice. Trace has a Python interface that efficiently converts a computational workflow into an OPTO instance using a PyTorch-like interface. Using Trace, we develop a general-purpose LLM-based optimizer called OptoPrime that can effectively solve OPTO problems. In empirical studies, we find that OptoPrime is capable of first-order numerical optimization, prompt optimization, hyper-parameter tuning, robot controller design, code debugging, etc., and is often competitive with specialized optimizers for each domain. We believe that Trace, OptoPrime and the OPTO framework will enable the next generation of interactive agents that automatically adapt using various kinds of feedback. Website: https://microsoft.github.io/Trace

Generative world models provide rich predictions of how manipulation scenes may evolve toward task objectives, yet those futures do not directly expose the compact task variables required by control. When training supervises future prediction alone, terminal goal accuracy is not an explicit learning objective, even when geometric recovery is available. We present Entity-Level Goal Readout, a learned prediction-to-execution interface that makes the executable terminal goal an explicit output of a 3D trace world model. It combines object-centric pose prediction with translation grounded in observed depth to produce a compact goal in SE(3). A shared Pose-Native Executor consumes this fixed goal with online object-pose feedback for closed-loop control without rerunning the world model. Across five manipulation tasks, the pipeline achieves a mean success rate of 79.69%. Goal diagnostics directly measure terminal goal accuracy, while controlled translation perturbations characterize how execution degrades under goal error. Zero-shot deployment on a Franka arm achieves 73.33% success on nominal StackCube, 66.67% with distractors, and 75.00% on PickPlate with a target unseen during policy training. These results support treating the prediction-to-execution interface as an explicit learned component of world-model planning rather than incidental post-processing in the control pipeline itself. Project page: https://claire0730.github.io/executable-goals/

Generative flow networks (GFlowNets) are a family of algorithms for training a sequential sampler of discrete objects under an unnormalized target density and have been successfully used for various probabilistic modeling tasks. Existing training objectives for GFlowNets are either local to states or transitions, or propagate a reward signal over an entire sampling trajectory. We argue that these alternatives represent opposite ends of a gradient bias-variance tradeoff and propose a way to exploit this tradeoff to mitigate its harmful effects. Inspired by the TD(lambda) algorithm in reinforcement learning, we introduce subtrajectory balance or SubTB(lambda), a GFlowNet training objective that can learn from partial action subsequences of varying lengths. We show that SubTB(lambda) accelerates sampler convergence in previously studied and new environments and enables training GFlowNets in environments with longer action sequences and sparser reward landscapes than what was possible before. We also perform a comparative analysis of stochastic gradient dynamics, shedding light on the bias-variance tradeoff in GFlowNet training and the advantages of subtrajectory balance.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

In mid-2026 a slogan reorganized how practitioners talk about coding agents: stop prompting your agent, start designing the loop that prompts it. We take this claim seriously and give it a careful treatment. We call the object of the new practice the loop specification: a bounded, reusable artifact, made of a trigger, a goal, a verification step, a stopping rule and a memory, that a human hands to an agent harness (such as Claude Code or Codex) so the agent pursues a goal on its own, in place of step-by-step prompting. We distinguish this external loop specification from two things it is often confused with: an ordinary programming loop, and the internal perceive-act-observe cycle that the harness already provides as plumbing. We position loop engineering as a new layer in the progression from prompt to context to harness to loop, and we argue, against the stronger headlines, that it does not retire prompt engineering; loop and prompt are distinct tools with distinct uses. We offer four contributions: a definition and scope for the discipline; an anatomy and taxonomy of loop specifications organized around trigger, goal type, a five-level verification ladder, architecture, and named terminal states; a descriptive analysis of the Loop Library, a public corpus of fifty real loops that we code by hand; and a set of design principles and anti-patterns grounded in the scientific literature on self-correction, reward hacking and model-as-judge fragility. The corpus shows that practice has matured most where the discipline says it matters: seventy percent of loops verify in the autonomous zone of the ladder and seventy-four percent name their terminal states, while automated triggering and durable memory remain comparatively underdeveloped. We close with the limits the practice must respect, including the verification burden, comprehension debt and the risk of cognitive surrender.

Recent work on LLM-driven autonomous penetration testing reports promising results, but existing systems often bundle architectural, prompting, and tool-integration choices together. This makes it difficult to determine what is gained over a simple agent and harness. We present Cochise, a 630 LOC Python reference implementation for autonomous penetration-testing experiments. Cochise connects to a Linux execution host over SSH and supports attacking controlled target environments reachable from that jump host. The prototype implements a Planner--Executor architecture in which long-term state is maintained by the planner, while a ReAct-style executor issues commands over SSH and self-corrects based on command outputs. The scenario prompt can be adapted to different target environments. We evaluate the harness against a live third-party testbed, Game of Active Directory (GOAD). Cochise is intended not as a state-of-the-art penetration-testing agent, but as a reusable experimental infrastructure for comparing models, agent architectures, and penetration-testing traces. Alongside the prototype, we release replay and analysis tools: (i) cochise-replay for offline visualization of captured runs, (ii) cochise-analyze-logs and cochise-analyze-graphs for cost, token, duration, and compromise analysis, and (iii) a corpus of JSON trajectory logs from GOAD runs, so that researchers can study agent behavior without provisioning the 48--64 GB RAM / 190 GB storage testbed themselves. Tool demo video available at https://youtu.be/2mQimB1ufyI.

State Space Models (SSMs) such as Mamba achieve linear-time sequence processing through input-dependent recurrence, but this mechanism introduces a critical safety vulnerability. We show that the spectral radius rho(A-bar) of the discretized transition operator governs effective memory horizon: when an adversary drives rho toward zero through gradient-based Hidden State Poisoning, memory collapses from millions of tokens to mere dozens, silently destroying reasoning capacity without triggering output-level alarms. We prove an Evasion Existence Theorem showing that for any output-only defense, adversarial inputs exist that simultaneously induce spectral collapse and evade detection, then introduce SpectralGuard, a real-time monitor that tracks spectral stability across all model layers. SpectralGuard achieves F1=0.961 against non-adaptive attackers and retains F1=0.842 under the strongest adaptive setting, with sub-15ms per-token latency. Causal interventions and cross-architecture transfer to hybrid SSM-Attention systems confirm that spectral monitoring provides a principled, deployable safety layer for recurrent foundation models.

Large language model (LLM) agents coordinate complex tasks through multi-role and multi-stage workflows. Upstream state is repeatedly transformed into intermediate language artifacts, such as summaries, plans, tickets, memories, and handoff notes, from which downstream components act. For action-constraining state, topical retention is insufficient: an artifact may mention an unresolved condition while changing it from a requirement that must be resolved before execution into information that may merely inform the next action. We study this action-binding role as operational state preservation. Safety blockers provide a controlled instance because each source state has an explicit prerequisite, authority, fallback, and execution consequence. We condition on correct upstream identification, vary the handoff transformation, and evaluate an executor restricted to the resulting artifact. Across 1,296 controlled synthetic episodes, direct-handoff controls preserve every blocker, whereas compression, plan assimilation, convergence, ownership deferral, and precedent substitution repeatedly turn binding state into caveats or non-binding considerations. Normal handoff compression produces 100.0% deactivation and 54.2% forbidden action. Restoring all four state fields raises preservation to 100.0% and reduces forbidden action to 0.0%. Fixed-artifact interventions further separate preservation from containment: downstream verification eliminates forbidden action while artifact deactivation remains 95.3%. These results identify a state-transmission failure between information extraction and action. Handoff transformations can retain state content while weakening its constraints on downstream action. Semantic availability does not guarantee operational preservation.

Reinforcement learning (RL) post-training has shown to improve reasoning in large language models (LLMs). However, there has been little exploration on the problem of data contamination in RL post-training, potentially undermining generalization and evaluation reliability of the training process itself. Existing detection methods primarily rely on output-level signals such as likelihood or entropy, which become unreliable for RL-trained models since RL shapes behavior through trajectory-level rewards rather than token likelihoods. We propose LaRA, a layer-wise representation analysis framework for detecting contamination in RL post-trained LLMs. LaRA introduces three complementary metrics, measuring perturbation sensitivity, directional collapse, and local representation rigidity under controlled perturbations. We find that contamination produces progressive geometric deviations across layers, including amplified perturbation sensitivity, stronger directional collapse, and enhanced local rigidity. Based on our findings, we also develop a contamination detection protocol that aggregates representation-level deviations across layers and metrics. Experiments on RL-trained reasoning models show that our protocol outperforms existing output-level baselines for contamination detection.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

Agent skills package instructions, executable code, and task-specific resources into reusable artifacts that agents can improve using execution feedback. The same mechanism also enables attackers to evolve malicious skills, making them more effective and less detectable. However, a candidate skill may pass pre-execution scanning yet fail to realize its target under runtime defenses, while a revision that repairs execution may introduce new scanner findings. We introduce SkillDRE, a fully automated framework for evolving complete malicious skill packages through a dual-stage feedback loop. Given a benign task and its associated skills, SkillDRE autonomously constructs and validates a task-conditioned malicious objective and a verifiable judge rule. It then holds both fixed while evolving the skill implementation, with preservation of legitimate task capability. SkillDRE combines scanner-guided evolution with runtime-guided refinement informed by execution outcomes observed under runtime defense. Each runtime-guided revision returns to the pre-execution stage for rescanning and further optimization before re-execution, forming a cross-stage closed loop. Evaluated on SkillsBench across four victim models, SkillDRE achieves an average attack success rate of 45.28%, exceeding the strongest baseline by 40.3%, while its final submitted skills receive no SkillScan findings and largely preserve benign-task performance. These results show that two-stage defense feedback can serve as a useful learning signal for adaptive red teaming and that evaluating either defense stage in isolation can miss the resulting attack capability. Codes is available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/SkillDRE

A coding agent can earn a passing grade by fixing its code, or by deleting the test that exposes the bug. Detecting such reward hacking requires recognizing attempted shortcuts, including those that fail. We release 173,561 annotated multi-turn coding trajectories from Qwen3-8B and show that supervising shortcut behavior independently of exploit success substantially improves detection. We introduce HACKTRACE, a behavior-supervised monitor that reads the internal states the agent already computes while generating code. Reusing these states enables monitoring before a turn is complete, without additional language-model tokens or passes. Combining this evidence with static features of the final files achieves a mean per-problem AUC of 0.997 with 8 ms of monitoring overhead, improving both accuracy and latency over monitors that run the model again on an honesty question and answer. The same generation states also provide an inexpensive monitoring signal for reinforcement learning. With strong GRPO penalties, HACKTRACE reduces the cheating share of passing solutions from 82-91% to 1-5%, while retaining honest, correct solutions and maintaining high detection accuracy as the policy evolves. Our results show that both the supervision target and the source of monitoring evidence matter for turning accurate detection into a useful training signal.

Prompt injection is listed as the \#1 threat to AI agents. When an agent accesses external data from websites, files, or emails, an attacker may inject a prompt into the data, saying, "Ignore all prior instructions and perform <an attacker's task>." To prevent arbitrary manipulation of agents, defenders try to train secure LLMs, which, however, still suffer from near 100% attack success rates (ASRs) against adaptive prompt injections. We note that this is because existing defensive finetuning recipes rely on sequence-level feedback signals (in DPO or GRPO). Treating an entire output equally prevents the model from learning precisely which output tokens are insecure. In this paper, we propose Secure On-Policy Distillation (SecOPD) that provides token-level feedback to guide defensive fine-tuning. The LLM receives an injected sample and produces a rollout, whose tokens are scored by the initialization model given the corresponding clean input. With more fine-grained training signals, our defended Qwen3.6-27B achieves a 9.0% ASR against the SoTA PISmith adaptive prompt injections, compared to 94.0% for the prior SoTA, Meta-SecAlign. The obtained security generalizes to domains completely unseen in training: in agentic tool calling, SecOPD achieves a 4.7% ASR compared to 5.5% for Meta-SecAlign. Code and the model are available at https://github.com/pppyb/SecOPD and https://huggingface.co/pybbb/Qwen3.6-27B-SecOPD.

Terminal agents are increasingly deployed beyond software engineering in science and other specialized domains. Constructing training environments requires executable reference behavior and a domain-specific verifier that distinguishes semantic correctness from superficially plausible artifacts. Authoring these components for each task requires repeated engineering and limits reuse. We introduce software-in-the-loop reconstruction, a self-supervised framework that obtains reference outputs and verification targets from existing software workflows, executable programs mapping structured inputs to outputs. For each workflow, we execute multiple input configurations and partition cases into public observations and hidden evaluations. Given the instruction, input schema, and public input--output observations, an agent constructs an editable program without access to the source workflow. The candidate is evaluated on hidden configurations against workflow outputs. A hierarchical verifier combines domain-specific semantic comparison, structural validity, and anti-shortcut checks, while public feedback supports iterative revision. The construction admits additional workflows and configurations without authoring a reference solution for each task. We instantiate SWR with 500 workflows and 46 software families across six domains. Across three attempts per task, Qwen3.8-Max solves 838 tasks and produces 1,422 verified trajectories, which we oversample to 3,000 reconstruction-only training examples. Supervised fine-tuning of Qwen3.8-27B improves mean Terminal-Bench 2 performance from 47.94% to 53.56% across three seeds and achieves the highest mean among four matched-token corpus controls on all four reported evaluations. These results indicate that existing scientific software can provide scalable, behaviorally verified supervision for terminal agents.

Agentic systems involved in high-stake decision-making under adversarial pressure need formal guarantees not offered by existing approaches. Motivated by the operational needs of security operations centers (SOCs) that must configure endpoint detection and response (EDR) policies under adversarial pressure, we present a tool-mediated architecture: LLM agents use deterministic tools (Stackelberg best-response, Bayesian observer updates, attack-graph primitives) and select from finite action catalogs enforced at the tool-output interface. A composite Lyapunov function machine-checked in Lean 4 with zero sorry certifies controllability, observability from asymmetric sensor data, and Input-to-State Stability (ISS) robustness under intelligent adversarial disturbance, with two corollaries extending the certificate to any controller or adversary from the catalogs. On 282 real enterprise attack graphs, the claims hold with margin. On paired offensive/defensive telemetry, a tool-mediated Claude Sonnet 4 controller reduces the attacker's expected payoff (game value) by 59% relative to a deterministic greedy baseline, with zero variance across 40 runs at four temperatures. A Claude Haiku 4.5 controller converges to suboptimal game values but stays catalog-bounded over an additional 40 runs, demonstrating that architectural stability is not dependent on the controller capability. The LLM agent's non-determinism furthers creative exploration of strategies, while the tool-mediated architecture ensures system stability.

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly coordinate real workloads by selecting and chaining third-party tools based on text-visible metadata such as tool names, descriptions, and return messages. We show that this convenience creates a supply-chain attack surface: a malicious MCP tool server can be co-registered alongside normal tools and induce overthinking loops, where individually trivial or plausible tool calls compose into cyclic trajectories that inflate end-to-end tokens and latency without any single step looking abnormal. We formalize this as a structural overthinking attack, distinguishable from token-level verbosity, and implement 14 malicious tools across three servers that trigger repetition, forced refinement, and distraction. Across heterogeneous registries and multiple tool-capable models, the attack causes severe resource amplification (up to 142.4times tokens) and can degrade task outcomes. Finally, we find that decoding-time concision controls do not reliably prevent loop induction, suggesting defenses should reason about tool-call structure rather than tokens alone.

Forecasting when AI systems will become capable of meaningfully accelerating AI research is a central challenge for AI safety. Existing benchmarks measure broad capability growth, but may not provide ample early warning signals for recursive self-improvement. We propose measuring AI's capability to autonomously implement end-to-end machine learning pipelines from past AI research breakthroughs, given a minimal task description. By providing a concise task description instead of the full prior work as reference, we hope to better elicit emerging AI research taste. We introduce a proof-of-concept benchmark in which frontier coding agents autonomously implement an AlphaZero-style machine learning pipeline for Connect Four on consumer hardware within a three-hour budget, and we evaluate the resulting game AIs in a round-robin tournament anchored to the Pascal Pons Connect Four solver. Across four agents with eight trials each, we find substantial differentiation: Claude Opus 4.7 won as first-mover against Pons in seven of eight trials, statistically significantly better than the other agents tested, none of which exceeded two of eight. The task, which no frontier agent could reliably complete when we began development in January of 2026, is now near-saturation. Our evaluation also surfaced anomalous behavior in GPT-5.4, which consistently used far less of its allocated time budget than other agents. A follow-up 16-trial probe using shorter, less evaluation-coded prompts substantially increased GPT-5.4's time-budget usage, consistent with but not diagnostic of sandbagging; Bradley-Terry ratings across probe conditions showed only directional differences, despite significant differences in time-budget usage. We release our data, code, and prompts to support reproduction and extension.

Executable evaluation -- checking the consequences of an agent's actions with a program rather than grading its prose -- has become a prominent way to assess tool-using AI agents in software settings. Electric power engineering has not yet had an analogous benchmark: language-model use is still dominated by retrieval and text question answering, while agents acting on power-system artifacts remain mostly academic prototypes. We introduce the Power Systems Agent Benchmark, an executable benchmark for power-engineering agents. An agent receives a structured task and returns a structured solution; a deterministic evaluator recomputes the engineering quantities, checks operational constraints, and returns a feasibility flag, a normalized score, and explicit violations. The benchmark contains 41 task families across eight areas of power engineering, from power flow and protection to stability, microgrids, reliability, power quality, and forecasting. Each task is grounded in a citable source, standard, or documented engineering formulation. To resist contamination, held-out cases are synthesized on demand by per-family generators from private seeds: the construction is inspectable, but the instances remain private. In a reference evaluation with three command-line agents, the strongest score near the compact tier's ceiling, a smaller open model trails, and public and held-out performance are broadly consistent; a separate public-split grid with OpenCode and Aider probes harness effects. The reference evaluation doubles as quality control: unanimous failures flag candidate task or evaluator defects, and it exposed a latent evaluator bug missed by self-consistency checks. The evaluators are compact deterministic surrogates, but the task contract allows their internals to be upgraded to simulator-backed checks without changing how tasks are posed or solved.

We assess indirect prompt injection in DeepSeek Harness (DSH), using AI-Infra-Guard (A.I.G) to construct tests, deliver controlled taint, execute DSH, collect traces, and judge outcomes. The study covers 14,560 controlled executions over 16 indirect-content channels, text and file carrier modes, 35 payload objectives, one unmodified baseline, and 12 attack methods. The experiment preserves DSH's agent loop, tool registry, model adapter, and session-event path; source tools and sensitive sinks are local fixtures, so attempted actions are recorded without external side effects. We evaluate each trace with a deterministic rule-based judge, (RuleJudge), and a semantic LLM-based judge, (LLMJudge). The strongest observed attack success rates are 17.0% under for fake-completion attack in text mode, 25.5% under for hidden Unicode in file mode, and 16.0% under for the skills channel in file mode. also assigns partial compliance more often than (7.3% versus 2.0%). We relate these results to DSH's treatment of tool results, additional contexts, and tool-call policy hooks, then identify controls that should sit between untrusted content and sensitive actions. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/Research/deepseek-harness-security-assessment .

Routing to select large language models (LLMs) with different cost-quality trade-offs has become a fundamental deployment feature of enterprise AI. Existing routers, primarily make independent routing decisions for each LLM call. However, agentic applications execute as long-horizon workflows whose quality is determined only by a delayed, task-level outcome. This mismatch prevents per-call routers from correctly attributing feedback to individual routing decisions. Towards mitigating this, we present TRACE-Router, a task-level routing framework that aligns routing with the unit of supervision. TRACE-Router assigns each task to a model once at admission using a contextual bandit, pins all subsequent LLM calls to the selected backend, and updates its policy using the task's terminal reward, jointly accounting for accuracy and latency. By leveraging delayed task feedback, TRACE-Router learns routing policies that adapt to the workload while avoiding explicit task-complexity estimation. Across three agentic benchmarks, TRACE-Router consistently improves the accuracy-latency trade-off, achieving non-dominated Pareto frontier points. On tau2-Bench, it outperforms latency-matched interpolation between individual models by 7-8 accuracy points, while on Terminal-Bench it achieves 7.1 higher accuracy points than the strongest single model baseline with 36% lower latency.

Even a few action perturbations can substantially degrade the performance of a deployed decision policy. Certifying the resulting return loss is challenging in stochastic environments, where returns vary even without an attack. We introduce FoSeRL, a framework for certifying deployed RL policies against precommitted, temporally sparse action attacks. The deployed policy is unchanged, with no smoothing or retraining. Certification requires a resettable simulator supporting shared randomness and independent one-step successor queries, but no analytical dynamics model. FoSeRL certifies that an attacked episode loses no more than a prescribed amount of return relative to the same episode unattacked, with at least a target probability and at a user-specified confidence level. Both runs share the initial state and randomness, so the measured loss reflects the attack, not the episode; carrying the running return gap as a state coordinate makes it the terminal value, reducing trajectory-level certification to terminal safety. Time-dependent barrier conditions on the augmented state bound the terminal failure probability: satisfied exactly, they certify every admissible precommitted attack; learned from sampled trajectories and verified on held-out data, they certify the same guarantee under a specified attack-episode setting. Across six stochastic continuous-control environments and three RL policy families (TD3, SAC, and PPO), FoSeRL certifies non-trivial cardinality--magnitude robustness frontiers, achieves substantially larger certified budgets than policy smoothing, and reveals marked robustness differences among policies with comparable nominal performance.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Modern software infrastructure increasingly relies on LLM agents for development and maintenance, such as Claude Code and Gemini-cli. However, these AI agents differ fundamentally from traditional deterministic software, posing a significant challenge to conventional monitoring and debugging. This creates a critical semantic gap: existing tools observe either an agent's high-level intent (via LLM prompts) or its low-level actions (e.g., system calls), but cannot correlate these two views. This blindness makes it difficult to distinguish between benign operations, malicious attacks, and costly failures. We introduce AgentSight, an AgentOps observability framework that bridges this semantic gap using a hybrid approach. Our approach, boundary tracing, monitors agents from outside their application code at stable system interfaces using eBPF. AgentSight intercepts TLS-encrypted LLM traffic to extract semantic intent, monitors kernel events to observe system-wide effects, and causally correlates these two streams across process boundaries using a real-time engine and secondary LLM analysis. This instrumentation-free technique is framework-agnostic, resilient to rapid API changes, and incurs less than 3% performance overhead. Our evaluation shows AgentSight detects prompt injection attacks, identifies resource-wasting reasoning loops, and reveals hidden coordination bottlenecks in multi-agent systems. AgentSight is released as an open-source project at https://github.com/agent-sight/agentsight.

In real-world Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) scenarios, where LLMs interleave reasoning with external tool calls, a major source of inefficiency is that the toolcalls create pauses between LLM requests and cause KV-Cache eviction, forcing recomputation. Also, the long, unfiltered response returned by external tools inflates the KV-Cache, so each decode step spends more time loading the growing cache and thus becomes steadily slower as context length increases. However, existing efficiency metrics like token counts and toolcall counts fail to capture the real model inference latency. To address this, we introduce PTE (Prefill Token Equivalents), a hardware-aware TIR-efficiency metric that unifies internal reasoning and external tool-use costs while explicitly accounting for non-reusable KV-Cache and long-tool-response scenarios. Validation in a high-concurrency industrial setting indicates that PTE aligns significantly better with wall-clock latency than standard token counts, while maintaining consistent efficiency rankings across diverse hardware profiles. We conduct extensive experiments across five TIR benchmarks, quantify their PTE costs, and identify four inefficiency patterns that appear in TIR. We also discover that trajectories with higher PTE costs tend to have lower reasoning correctness, indicating that simply using more tools does not improve the quality of the answer.

Hidden malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue poses a growing threat to deployed large language models (LLMs). Rather than exposing a harmful objective in a single prompt, increasingly capable attackers can distribute their intent across multiple benign-looking turns. Recent studies show that even modern commercial models with advanced guardrails remain vulnerable to such attacks despite advances in safety alignment and external guardrails. In this work, we address this challenge by detecting the earliest turn at which delivering the candidate response would make the accumulated interaction sufficient to enable harmful action. This objective requires precise turn-level intervention that identifies the harm-enabling closure point while avoiding premature refusal of benign exploratory conversations. To further support training and evaluation, we construct the Multi-Turn Intent Dataset (MTID), which contains branching attack rollouts, matched benign hard negatives, and annotations of the earliest harm-enabling turns. We show that MTID helps enable a turn-level monitor TurnGate, which substantially outperforms existing baselines in harmful-intent detection while maintaining low over-refusal rates. TurnGate further generalizes across domains, attacker pipelines, and target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/TurnGate.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified. We introduce MAMA (Multi-Agent Memory Attack), a controlled evaluation framework for comparing topology-conditioned memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems. MAMA operates on synthetic documents containing labeled Personally Identifiable Information (PII) entities, from which we generate sanitized task instructions. We execute a two-phase protocol: Engram (seeding private information into a target agent's memory) and Resonance (multi-round interaction where an attacker attempts extraction). Over 10 rounds, we measure leakage using a two-stage recovery criterion that combines exact-match extraction with LLM-based inference over the attacker's final output. We evaluate six canonical topologies (complete, circle, chain, tree, star, star-ring) across nin{4,5,6}, attacker-target placements, and base models. Results are consistent: denser connectivity, shorter attacker-target distance, and higher target centrality increase leakage; most leakage occurs in early rounds and then plateaus; model choice shifts absolute rates but preserves broad structural trends; spatiotemporal/location attributes leak more readily than identity credentials or regulated identifiers. We distill practical guidance for system design: favor sparse or hierarchical connectivity, maximize attacker-target separation, and restrict hub/shortcut pathways via topology-aware access control. Our code is available at https://github.com/llll121/mama-eval.

AI compute verification is one of the first tangible and tractable points for international policy aimed at AI governance. Determining whether frontier labs, or any operator, comply with agreements requires the regulating authority to discern how their compute is used. The elementary building block of AI compute is the GPU, and any activity it executes leaves a physical trace. Here, we show that an external observer can identify the class of the workload running on an NVIDIA H200 from its power draw. Unlike on-chip NVML telemetry, which can be spoofed or replayed, such a physical channel can in principle be observed independently of operator cooperation. We recorded 930 five-second traces at sim 10 MHz, covering seventeen open LLM families and twenty-five non-AI workloads. Over this corpus we separate training from inference and from non-AI computation with an accuracy of 97% and a macro-averaged F1 score of 0.955, evaluated on model families unseen during training. AI workload spectral content predominantly lies below sim 20kHz and training is particularly recognizable through the memory-bound optimizer update. The GPU operator is then treated as adversarial and able to reshape the physical computation itself. Four evasion strategies are tested to disguise training as inference, producing an additional 680 adversarial traces. A detector hardened against evasion strategies, with the tested strategy held out, catches training geq 99% of the time for three of the four strategies. The fourth, diluted low-rank adaptation (LoRA), is detected 48--88% of the time with a hardened classifier, rising to geq 98% with an additional rescue rule. While these attacks are not a comprehensive evaluation against adversarial behaviour, they offer initial insights beyond genuine activities and a dataset for developing and testing stronger evasion mechanisms.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models produce routing information during inference that may be logged or exposed for monitoring, debugging, load analysis, and safety auditing. Unlike ordinary model outputs, this telemetry reveals a view of the model's internal computation, raising a privacy question: can it reveal whether an example was used to fine-tune the deployed model? We introduce a router-augmented membership inference attack that combines conventional output-side signals with aggregated routing features and applies a membership classifier learned from independently fine-tuned shadow models to the target model. Across three MoE architectures and three data domains, router telemetry consistently improves membership inference over a strong output-signal ensemble, increasing TPR at 1\% FPR by 2.7--9.4 percentage points across all nine settings. The leakage persists across full fine-tuning, frozen-router training, LoRA, and instruction tuning, and remains observable with only discrete expert selections, restricted telemetry, or a single shadow model. Mechanistic analysis further shows that the leakage does not require router-specific memorization: fine-tuning introduces membership information into hidden representations, while the router exposes a projection of this signal even when its parameters are frozen. Perturbing the telemetry reduces this additional leakage only as its fidelity degrades. Our results show that router telemetry can turn an operational signal into an additional privacy surface for fine-tuned MoE models.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

Multi-path speculative decoding accelerates lossless sampling from a target model by using a cheaper draft model to generate a draft tree of tokens, and then applies a verification algorithm that accepts a subset of these. While prior work has proposed various verification algorithms for i.i.d rollouts, their relative performance under matched settings remains unclear. In this work, we firstly present a systematic evaluation of verification strategies across model families, tasks, and sampling regimes, and find that Traversal Verification dominates consistently, with OT-based methods lagging far behind. Our analysis uncovers that this occurs because OT-based methods achieve high multi-token acceptance near the root of the draft tree, while multi-token gains are most impactful deeper in the draft tree, where draft and target distributions diverge. Based on this insight, we propose delayed tree expansion, which drafts a partial single path, delaying the i.i.d. branching point. We show that delayed tree expansion preserves the target distribution and improves on root-node i.i.d rollouts. Further, we develop a dynamic neural selector that estimates the expected block efficiency of optimal-transport-based verification methods from draft and target features, enabling context-dependent expansion decisions. Our neural selector allows OT-based methods like SpecInfer to outperform Traversal Verification for the first time, achieving 5% higher average throughput across a wide range of models, datasets, and sampling settings.

Synthesizing inductive loop invariants is fundamental to automating program verification. In this work, we observe that Large Language Models (such as gpt-3.5 or gpt-4) are capable of synthesizing loop invariants for a class of programs in a 0-shot setting, yet require several samples to generate the correct invariants. This can lead to a large number of calls to a program verifier to establish an invariant. To address this issue, we propose a {\it re-ranking} approach for the generated results of LLMs. We have designed a ranker that can distinguish between correct inductive invariants and incorrect attempts based on the problem definition. The ranker is optimized as a contrastive ranker. Experimental results demonstrate that this re-ranking mechanism significantly improves the ranking of correct invariants among the generated candidates, leading to a notable reduction in the number of calls to a verifier.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable tool-use capabilities, yet their application to power system operations remains largely unexplored. This paper presents Grid-Mind, a domain-specific LLM agent that interprets natural-language interconnection requests and autonomously orchestrates multi-fidelity power system simulations. The LLM-first architecture positions the language model as the central decision-making entity, employing an eleven-tool registry to execute Connection Impact Assessment (CIA) studies spanning steadystate power flow, N-1 contingency analysis, transient stability, and electromagnetic transient screening. A violation inspector grounds every decision in quantitative simulation outputs, while a three-layer anti-hallucination defence mitigates numerical fabrication risk through forced capacity-tool routing and post-response grounding validation. A prompt-level self-correction mechanism extracts distilled lessons from agent failures, yielding progressive accuracy improvements without model retraining. End-to-end evaluation on 50 IEEE 118-bus scenarios (DeepSeek-V3, 2026-02-23) achieved 84.0% tool-selection accuracy and 100% parsing accuracy. A separate 56-scenario self-correction suite passed 49 of 56 cases (87.5%) with a mean score of 89.3. These results establish a reproducible baseline for continued refinement while maintaining auditable, simulation-grounded decision support.

Typical reinforcement learning (RL) methods for LLM reasoning waste compute on hard problems, where correct on-policy traces are rare, policy gradients vanish, and learning stalls. To bootstrap more efficient RL, we consider reusing old sampling FLOPs (from prior inference or RL training) in the form of off-policy traces. Standard off-policy methods supervise against off-policy data, causing instabilities during RL optimization. We introduce PrefixRL, where we condition on the prefix of successful off-policy traces and run on-policy RL to complete them, side-stepping off-policy instabilities. PrefixRL boosts the learning signal on hard problems by modulating the difficulty of the problem through the off-policy prefix length. We prove that the PrefixRL objective is not only consistent with the standard RL objective but also more sample efficient. Empirically, we discover back-generalization: training only on prefixed problems generalizes to out-of-distribution unprefixed performance, with learned strategies often differing from those in the prefix. In our experiments, we source the off-policy traces by rejection sampling with the base model, creating a self-improvement loop. On hard reasoning problems, PrefixRL reaches the same training reward 2x faster than the strongest baseline (SFT on off-policy data then RL), even after accounting for the compute spent on the initial rejection sampling, and increases the final reward by 3x. The gains transfer to held-out benchmarks, and PrefixRL is still effective when off-policy traces are derived from a different model family, validating its flexibility in practical settings.

Flow matching models excel at generative modeling, and many downstream applications require their samples to satisfy prescribed constraints, such as observed measurements and physical laws. However, existing constrained samplers often face a trade-off: enforcing constraints can substantially displace samples from the pretrained data distribution. To address this trade-off, we introduce MintFlow, a training-free constrained sampling framework that formulates constraint enforcement as a minimal intervention on the pretrained flow trajectory. MintFlow seeks the minimal perturbation of an intermediate flow state such that its subsequent evolution under the pretrained flow field satisfies the target constraint. By minimally perturbing the flow state while keeping the pretrained flow field unchanged, MintFlow enforces the constraint while minimizing unnecessary deviation from the pretrained distribution. An adjoint formulation yields a closed-form expression for this perturbation, eliminating expensive iterative optimization. Furthermore, MintFlow adaptively selects the intervention time to balance the required perturbation magnitude with its amplification by the remaining flow. Across a range of tasks in generative vision and physical system modeling, MintFlow achieves competitive constraint satisfaction while preserving the pretrained generative distribution substantially better than state-of-the-art constrained methods.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Motivated by neuroscientific and clinical applications, we empirically examine whether observational measures of information flow can suggest interventions. We do so by performing experiments on artificial neural networks in the context of fairness in machine learning, where the goal is to induce fairness in the system through interventions. Using our recently developed M-information flow framework, we measure the flow of information about the true label (responsible for accuracy, and hence desirable), and separately, the flow of information about a protected attribute (responsible for bias, and hence undesirable) on the edges of a trained neural network. We then compare the flow magnitudes against the effect of intervening on those edges by pruning. We show that pruning edges that carry larger information flows about the protected attribute reduces bias at the output to a greater extent. This demonstrates that M-information flow can meaningfully suggest targets for interventions, answering the title's question in the affirmative. We also evaluate bias-accuracy tradeoffs for different intervention strategies, to analyze how one might use estimates of desirable and undesirable information flows (here, accuracy and bias flows) to inform interventions that preserve the former while reducing the latter.

Language models are increasingly capable and are being rapidly deployed on a population-level scale. As a result, the safety of these models is increasingly high-stakes. Fortunately, advances in alignment have significantly reduced the likelihood of harmful model outputs. However, when models are queried billions of times in a day, even rare worst-case behaviors will occur. Current safety evaluations focus on capturing the distribution of inputs that yield harmful outputs. These evaluations disregard the probabilistic nature of models and their tail output behavior. To measure this tail risk, we propose a method to efficiently estimate the probability of harmful outputs for any input query. Instead of naive brute-force sampling from the target model, where harmful outputs could be rare, we operationalize importance sampling by creating unsafe versions of the target model. These unsafe versions enable sample-efficient estimation by making harmful outputs more probable. On benchmarks measuring misuse and misalignment, these estimates match brute-force Monte Carlo estimates using 10-20x fewer samples. For example, we can estimate probability of harmful outputs on the order of 10^-4 with just 500 samples. Additionally, we find that these harmfulness estimates can reveal the sensitivity of models to perturbations in model input and predict deployment risks. Our work demonstrates that accurate rare-event estimation is both critical and feasible for safety evaluations. Code is available at https://github.com/rangell/LMTailRisk

KV cache compression promises increased throughput and efficiency with negligible loss in performance. While the gains in throughput are indisputable and recent literature has indeed shown minimal degradation on particular benchmarks, in general the consequences of compression in realistic scenarios such as multi-instruction prompting have been insufficiently studied. In this paper, we identify several pitfalls practitioners should be aware of when deploying KV cache compressed LLMs. Importantly, we show that certain instructions degrade much more rapidly with compression, effectively causing them to be completely ignored by the LLM. As a practical example of that, we highlight system prompt leakage as a case study, empirically showing the impact of compression on leakage and general instruction following. We show several factors that play a role in prompt leakage: compression method, instruction order, and KV eviction bias. We then propose simple changes to KV cache eviction policies that can reduce the impact of these factors and improve the overall performance in multi-instruction tasks.

We introduce Guard Vector, a safety task vector computed as the parameter difference between a guardrail model (Guard Model) and a same-architecture pretrained language model. Composing this vector with a target language model yields a Target Guard Model (TGM). We then adapt TGM with a streaming-aware approach that combines prefix-based training and evaluation with a classifier that produces a single-token output. With this composition alone, TGM improves classification quality over established Guard Models across standard safety suites and enables language extensibility to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, requiring neither additional training nor target language labels. It also demonstrates model portability across two widely used public guardrail backbones, Llama and Gemma. With prefix SFT (supervised fine-tuning), TGM preserves classification quality under streaming by aligning the behavior between prefix inputs and full-text inputs. The single-token output design increases throughput and reduces latency. Together, these components reduce data and compute requirements while promoting streaming-aware evaluation practices, thereby contributing to a more responsible AI ecosystem.

Machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are critical for securing Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. Most adversarial research against them perturbs the feature vector or the traffic that produces it, and depends on gradient access, repeated model queries, or a learned model of benign traffic. A smaller line of work reshapes packet timing without querying the detector, but makes malicious traffic mimic a learned model of benign timing. Across these approaches, one assumption of industrial monitoring pipelines has received little attention: temporal synchronization. An IDS reconstructs operational state by aggregating telemetry into sliding or tumbling windows, so its view depends not only on what is observed but on when each observation falls relative to a window boundary. We introduce the Phantom State Attack (PSA), which exploits that dependence under a passive, zero-query threat model. Rather than modifying packets, perturbing features, querying the classifier, or fitting any model of benign traffic, PSA injects bounded timing drift calibrated to the attack flow's own inter-arrival variability, moving observations across the nearest window boundary by the minimal shift needed. The IDS then reconstructs a phantom state that diverges from the true process state. We evaluate PSA on ToN-IoT and CIC IIoT 2025 (DataSense), against Random Forest, MLP and XGBoost, measuring detection degradation, synchronization distortion, stealth, and attacker cost. PSA degrades detection on flows carrying enough packets for window-boundary redistribution, and leaves others almost unchanged, so its effect is conditional. A query-based baseline reaches higher raw success but needs many queries per window, while PSA needs none. The results identify temporal aggregation as an attack surface reachable under weaker assumptions than prior evasion techniques.

Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) empowers large language models (LLMs) to tackle complex tasks by interleaving reasoning steps with external tool interactions. However, existing reinforcement learning methods typically rely on outcome- or trajectory-level rewards, assigning uniform advantages to all steps within a trajectory. This coarse-grained credit assignment fails to distinguish effective tool calls from redundant or erroneous ones, particularly in long-horizon multi-turn scenarios. To address this, we propose MatchTIR, a framework that introduces fine-grained supervision via bipartite matching-based turn-level reward assignment and dual-level advantage estimation. Specifically, we formulate credit assignment as a bipartite matching problem between predicted and ground-truth traces, utilizing two assignment strategies to derive dense turn-level rewards. Furthermore, to balance local step precision with global task success, we introduce a dual-level advantage estimation scheme that integrates turn-level and trajectory-level signals, assigning distinct advantage values to individual interaction turns. Extensive experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of MatchTIR. Notably, our 4B model surpasses the majority of 8B competitors, particularly in long-horizon and multi-turn tasks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/quchangle1/MatchTIR.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents. Although many defenses have been proposed, their robustness against adaptive attacks remains insufficiently evaluated, potentially creating a false sense of security. In this work, we propose PISmith, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based red-teaming framework that systematically assesses existing prompt-injection defenses by training an attack LLM to optimize injected prompts in a practical black-box setting, where the attacker can only query the defended LLM and observe its outputs. We find that directly applying standard GRPO to attack strong defenses leads to sub-optimal performance due to extreme reward sparsity -- most generated injected prompts are blocked by the defense, causing the policy's entropy to collapse before discovering effective attack strategies, while the rare successes cannot be learned effectively. In response, we introduce adaptive entropy regularization and dynamic advantage weighting to sustain exploration and amplify learning from scarce successes. Extensive evaluation on 13 benchmarks demonstrates that state-of-the-art prompt injection defenses remain vulnerable to adaptive attacks. We also compare PISmith with 7 baselines across static, search-based, and RL-based attack categories, showing that PISmith consistently achieves the highest attack success rates. Furthermore, PISmith achieves strong performance in agentic settings on InjecAgent and AgentDojo against both open-source and closed-source LLMs (e.g., GPT-4o-mini and GPT-5-nano). Our code is available at https://github.com/albert-y1n/PISmith.

While large-scale text-to-image generative models have achieved unprecedented visual performance, their inherent reliance on multi-step iterative solvers incurs severe inference latency. Few-step distillation targeting the Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG) trajectory has emerged as the prevalent dual-dimensional compression paradigm. However, existing frameworks remain subjugated by a coarse-grained blind injection paradigm that perpetually enforces a globally static guidance strength while indiscriminately sampling the supervisor timestep. This state-agnostic design completely disregards the intrinsic nature of image generation as a dynamic evolutionary process characterized by progressive entropy reduction, which not only restricts the performance boundary of few-step compression but also precipitates severe CFG over-conditioning artifacts. To transcend these limitations, we re-examine the distillation procedure through the theoretical lens of Information Theory, formally modeling it as a dynamic mutual information game constrained by the Information Bottleneck (IB) principle. Specifically, we dismantle traditional blind assumptions via a dual-track adaptive framework. To determine the injection target, we propose an instance-aware selection mechanism that transmutes the intractable KL divergence constraint into a zero-overhead closed-form solution predicated on the local vector field norm. To regulate the injection strength, we introduce an entropy-aware schedule that dynamically decays alongside the SNR, applying maximal thrust for initial structural anchoring before smoothly reverting to the natural manifold to refine micro-details. Extensive empirical evaluations corroborate that our framework fundamentally eradicates over-conditioning artifacts, shattering the performance ceiling to achieve SOTA generative fidelity under extremely stringent 2-step configurations.

As demand for LLM inference grows, it is becoming increasingly important that providers and their customers can verify that inference processes are performed correctly, without errors or tampering. However, re-running the same inference process twice often leads to different results due to benign numerical noise, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate variation from actual problems. To address this problem, we introduce Token-DiFR (Token-Divergence-From-Reference), a method for verifying inference outputs by comparing generated tokens against predictions made by a trusted reference implementation conditioned on the same random seed. Sampling seed synchronization tightly constrains valid outputs, leaving providers minimal room to deviate from correct inference, which allows output tokens themselves to serve as auditable evidence of correctness at zero additional cost to the provider. Token-DiFR reliably identifies sampling errors, simulated bugs, and model quantization, detecting 4-bit quantization with AUC > 0.999 within 300 output tokens. For applications requiring sample-efficient forward-pass verification, we additionally introduce Activation-DiFR, a scheme that uses random orthogonal projections to compress activations into compact fingerprints for subsequent verification. Activation-DiFR detects 4-bit quantization with AUC > 0.999 using just 2 output tokens, while reducing communication overhead by 25-75% relative to existing methods. We release an open-source integration with vLLM to accelerate practical deployment of verifiable inference.