Daily Papers

Enhancing the intelligibility and interpretability of machine learning is a crucial task in responding to the demand for Explicability as an AI principle, and in promoting the better social implementation of AI. The aim of our research is to contribute to this improvement by reformulating machine learning models through the lens of category theory, thereby developing a semantic framework for structuring and understanding AI systems. Our categorical modeling in this paper clarifies and formalizes the structural interplay between residuals and parameters in supervised learning. The present paper focuses on the multiple linear regression model, which represents the most basic form of supervised learning. By defining two concrete categories corresponding to parameters and data, along with an adjoint pair of functors between them, we introduce our categorical formulation of supervised learning. We show that the essential structure of this framework is captured by what we call the Gauss-Markov Adjunction. Within this setting, the dual flow of information can be explicitly described as a correspondence between variations in parameters and residuals. The ordinary least squares estimator for the parameters and the minimum residual are related via the preservation of limits by the right adjoint functor. Furthermore, we position this formulation as an instance of extended denotational semantics for supervised learning, and propose applying a semantic perspective developed in theoretical computer science as a formal foundation for Explicability in AI.

There has recently been a surge of work in explanatory artificial intelligence (XAI). This research area tackles the important problem that complex machines and algorithms often cannot provide insights into their behavior and thought processes. XAI allows users and parts of the internal system to be more transparent, providing explanations of their decisions in some level of detail. These explanations are important to ensure algorithmic fairness, identify potential bias/problems in the training data, and to ensure that the algorithms perform as expected. However, explanations produced by these systems is neither standardized nor systematically assessed. In an effort to create best practices and identify open challenges, we provide our definition of explainability and show how it can be used to classify existing literature. We discuss why current approaches to explanatory methods especially for deep neural networks are insufficient. Finally, based on our survey, we conclude with suggested future research directions for explanatory artificial intelligence.

Explanatory inference is the creation and evaluation of hypotheses that provide explanations, and is sometimes known as abduction or abductive inference. Generative AI is a new set of artificial intelligence models based on novel algorithms for generating text, images, and sounds. This paper proposes a set of benchmarks for assessing the ability of AI programs to perform explanatory inference, and uses them to determine the extent to which ChatGPT, a leading generative AI model, is capable of making explanatory inferences. Tests on the benchmarks reveal that ChatGPT performs creative and evaluative inferences in many domains, although it is limited to verbal and visual modalities. Claims that ChatGPT and similar models are incapable of explanation, understanding, causal reasoning, meaning, and creativity are rebutted.

In Vitro Fertilization is among the most widespread treatments for infertility. One of its main challenges is the evaluation and selection of embryo for implantation, a process with large inter- and intra-clinician variability. Deep learning based methods are gaining attention, but their opaque nature compromises their acceptance in the clinical context, where transparency in the decision making is key. In this paper we analyze the current work in the explainability of AI-assisted embryo analysis models, identifying the limitations. We also discuss how these models could be integrated in the clinical context as decision support systems, considering the needs of clinicians and patients. Finally, we propose guidelines for the sake of increasing interpretability and trustworthiness, pushing this technology forward towards established clinical practice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in tasks requiring interpretive and inferential accuracy. In this paper, we introduce ExpliCa, a new dataset for evaluating LLMs in explicit causal reasoning. ExpliCa uniquely integrates both causal and temporal relations presented in different linguistic orders and explicitly expressed by linguistic connectives. The dataset is enriched with crowdsourced human acceptability ratings. We tested LLMs on ExpliCa through prompting and perplexity-based metrics. We assessed seven commercial and open-source LLMs, revealing that even top models struggle to reach 0.80 accuracy. Interestingly, models tend to confound temporal relations with causal ones, and their performance is also strongly influenced by the linguistic order of the events. Finally, perplexity-based scores and prompting performance are differently affected by model size.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

We introduce Explanatory Learning (EL), a framework to let machines use existing knowledge buried in symbolic sequences -- e.g. explanations written in hieroglyphic -- by autonomously learning to interpret them. In EL, the burden of interpreting symbols is not left to humans or rigid human-coded compilers, as done in Program Synthesis. Rather, EL calls for a learned interpreter, built upon a limited collection of symbolic sequences paired with observations of several phenomena. This interpreter can be used to make predictions on a novel phenomenon given its explanation, and even to find that explanation using only a handful of observations, like human scientists do. We formulate the EL problem as a simple binary classification task, so that common end-to-end approaches aligned with the dominant empiricist view of machine learning could, in principle, solve it. To these models, we oppose Critical Rationalist Networks (CRNs), which instead embrace a rationalist view on the acquisition of knowledge. CRNs express several desired properties by construction, they are truly explainable, can adjust their processing at test-time for harder inferences, and can offer strong confidence guarantees on their predictions. As a final contribution, we introduce Odeen, a basic EL environment that simulates a small flatland-style universe full of phenomena to explain. Using Odeen as a testbed, we show how CRNs outperform empiricist end-to-end approaches of similar size and architecture (Transformers) in discovering explanations for novel phenomena.

In this paper, we introduce the idea of decomposing the residuals of regression with respect to the data instances instead of features. This allows us to determine the effects of each individual instance on the model and each other, and in doing so makes for a model-agnostic method of identifying instances of interest. In doing so, we can also determine the appropriateness of the model and data in the wider context of a given study. The paper focuses on the possible applications that such a framework brings to the relatively unexplored field of instance analysis in the context of Explainable AI tasks.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in legal judgment prediction (LJP) has the potential to transform the legal landscape, particularly in jurisdictions like India, where a significant backlog of cases burdens the legal system. This paper introduces NyayaAnumana, the largest and most diverse corpus of Indian legal cases compiled for LJP, encompassing a total of 7,02,945 preprocessed cases. NyayaAnumana, which combines the words "Nyay" (judgment) and "Anuman" (prediction or inference) respectively for most major Indian languages, includes a wide range of cases from the Supreme Court, High Courts, Tribunal Courts, District Courts, and Daily Orders and, thus, provides unparalleled diversity and coverage. Our dataset surpasses existing datasets like PredEx and ILDC, offering a comprehensive foundation for advanced AI research in the legal domain. In addition to the dataset, we present INLegalLlama, a domain-specific generative large language model (LLM) tailored to the intricacies of the Indian legal system. It is developed through a two-phase training approach over a base LLaMa model. First, Indian legal documents are injected using continual pretraining. Second, task-specific supervised finetuning is done. This method allows the model to achieve a deeper understanding of legal contexts. Our experiments demonstrate that incorporating diverse court data significantly boosts model accuracy, achieving approximately 90% F1-score in prediction tasks. INLegalLlama not only improves prediction accuracy but also offers comprehensible explanations, addressing the need for explainability in AI-assisted legal decisions.

Legal reasoning requires both precise interpretation of statutory language and consistent application of complex rules, presenting significant challenges for AI systems. This paper introduces a modular multi-agent framework that decomposes legal reasoning into distinct knowledge acquisition and application stages. In the first stage, specialized agents extract legal concepts and formalize rules to create verifiable intermediate representations of statutes. The second stage applies this knowledge to specific cases through three steps: analyzing queries to map case facts onto the ontology schema, performing symbolic inference to derive logically entailed conclusions, and generating final answers using a programmatic implementation that operationalizes the ontological knowledge. This bridging of natural language understanding with symbolic reasoning provides explicit and verifiable inspection points, significantly enhancing transparency compared to end-to-end approaches. Evaluation on statutory tax calculation tasks demonstrates substantial improvements, with foundational models achieving 76.4\% accuracy compared to 18.8\% baseline performance, effectively narrowing the performance gap between reasoning and foundational models. These findings suggest that modular architectures with formalized knowledge representations can make sophisticated legal reasoning more accessible through computationally efficient models while enhancing consistency and explainability in AI legal reasoning, establishing a foundation for future research into more transparent, trustworthy, and effective AI systems for legal domain.

Interpretability of Deep Learning (DL) is a barrier to trustworthy AI. Despite great efforts made by the Explainable AI (XAI) community, explanations lack robustness -- indistinguishable input perturbations may lead to different XAI results. Thus, it is vital to assess how robust DL interpretability is, given an XAI method. In this paper, we identify several challenges that the state-of-the-art is unable to cope with collectively: i) existing metrics are not comprehensive; ii) XAI techniques are highly heterogeneous; iii) misinterpretations are normally rare events. To tackle these challenges, we introduce two black-box evaluation methods, concerning the worst-case interpretation discrepancy and a probabilistic notion of how robust in general, respectively. Genetic Algorithm (GA) with bespoke fitness function is used to solve constrained optimisation for efficient worst-case evaluation. Subset Simulation (SS), dedicated to estimate rare event probabilities, is used for evaluating overall robustness. Experiments show that the accuracy, sensitivity, and efficiency of our methods outperform the state-of-the-arts. Finally, we demonstrate two applications of our methods: ranking robust XAI methods and selecting training schemes to improve both classification and interpretation robustness.

Algorithmic approaches to interpreting machine learning models have proliferated in recent years. We carry out human subject tests that are the first of their kind to isolate the effect of algorithmic explanations on a key aspect of model interpretability, simulatability, while avoiding important confounding experimental factors. A model is simulatable when a person can predict its behavior on new inputs. Through two kinds of simulation tests involving text and tabular data, we evaluate five explanations methods: (1) LIME, (2) Anchor, (3) Decision Boundary, (4) a Prototype model, and (5) a Composite approach that combines explanations from each method. Clear evidence of method effectiveness is found in very few cases: LIME improves simulatability in tabular classification, and our Prototype method is effective in counterfactual simulation tests. We also collect subjective ratings of explanations, but we do not find that ratings are predictive of how helpful explanations are. Our results provide the first reliable and comprehensive estimates of how explanations influence simulatability across a variety of explanation methods and data domains. We show that (1) we need to be careful about the metrics we use to evaluate explanation methods, and (2) there is significant room for improvement in current methods. All our supporting code, data, and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/peterbhase/InterpretableNLP-ACL2020

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is a young but very promising field of research. Unfortunately, the progress in this field is currently slowed down by divergent and incompatible goals. We separate various threads tangled within the area of XAI into two complementary cultures of human/value-oriented explanations (BLUE XAI) and model/validation-oriented explanations (RED XAI). This position paper argues that the area of RED XAI is currently under-explored, i.e., more methods for explainability are desperately needed to question models (e.g., extract knowledge from well-performing models as well as spotting and fixing bugs in faulty models), and the area of RED XAI hides great opportunities and potential for important research necessary to ensure the safety of AI systems. We conclude this paper by presenting promising challenges in this area.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

AI led chess systems to a superhuman level, yet these systems heavily rely on black-box algorithms. This is unsustainable in ensuring transparency to the end-user, particularly when these systems are responsible for sensitive decision-making. Recent interpretability work has shown that the inner representations of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) were fathomable and contained human-understandable concepts. Yet, these methods are seldom contextualised and are often based on a single hidden state, which makes them unable to interpret multi-step reasoning, e.g. planning. In this respect, we propose contrastive sparse autoencoders (CSAE), a novel framework for studying pairs of game trajectories. Using CSAE, we are able to extract and interpret concepts that are meaningful to the chess-agent plans. We primarily focused on a qualitative analysis of the CSAE features before proposing an automated feature taxonomy. Furthermore, to evaluate the quality of our trained CSAE, we devise sanity checks to wave spurious correlations in our results.

In a striking neuroscience study, the authors placed a dead salmon in an MRI scanner and showed it images of humans in social situations. Astonishingly, standard analyses of the time reported brain regions predictive of social emotions. The explanation, of course, was not supernatural cognition but a cautionary tale about misapplied statistical inference. In AI interpretability, reports of similar ''dead salmon'' artifacts abound: feature attribution, probing, sparse auto-encoding, and even causal analyses can produce plausible-looking explanations for randomly initialized neural networks. In this work, we examine this phenomenon and argue for a pragmatic statistical-causal reframing: explanations of computational systems should be treated as parameters of a (statistical) model, inferred from computational traces. This perspective goes beyond simply measuring statistical variability of explanations due to finite sampling of input data; interpretability methods become statistical estimators, and findings should be tested against explicit and meaningful alternative computational hypotheses, with uncertainty quantified with respect to the postulated statistical model. It also highlights important theoretical issues, such as the identifiability of common interpretability queries, which we argue is critical to understand the field's susceptibility to false discoveries, poor generalizability, and high variance. More broadly, situating interpretability within the standard toolkit of statistical inference opens promising avenues for future work aimed at turning AI interpretability into a pragmatic and rigorous science.

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of alterfactual explanations for black box image classifiers. Traditional explanation mechanisms from the field of Counterfactual Thinking are a widely-used paradigm for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), as they follow a natural way of reasoning that humans are familiar with. However, most common approaches from this field are based on communicating information about features or characteristics that are especially important for an AI's decision. However, to fully understand a decision, not only knowledge about relevant features is needed, but the awareness of irrelevant information also highly contributes to the creation of a user's mental model of an AI system. To this end, a novel approach for explaining AI systems called alterfactual explanations was recently proposed on a conceptual level. It is based on showing an alternative reality where irrelevant features of an AI's input are altered. By doing so, the user directly sees which input data characteristics can change arbitrarily without influencing the AI's decision. In this paper, we show for the first time that it is possible to apply this idea to black box models based on neural networks. To this end, we present a GAN-based approach to generate these alterfactual explanations for binary image classifiers. Further, we present a user study that gives interesting insights on how alterfactual explanations can complement counterfactual explanations.

Explainability and interpretability of AI models is an essential factor affecting the safety of AI. While various explainable AI (XAI) approaches aim at mitigating the lack of transparency in deep networks, the evidence of the effectiveness of these approaches in improving usability, trust, and understanding of AI systems are still missing. We evaluate multimodal explanations in the setting of a Visual Question Answering (VQA) task, by asking users to predict the response accuracy of a VQA agent with and without explanations. We use between-subjects and within-subjects experiments to probe explanation effectiveness in terms of improving user prediction accuracy, confidence, and reliance, among other factors. The results indicate that the explanations help improve human prediction accuracy, especially in trials when the VQA system's answer is inaccurate. Furthermore, we introduce active attention, a novel method for evaluating causal attentional effects through intervention by editing attention maps. User explanation ratings are strongly correlated with human prediction accuracy and suggest the efficacy of these explanations in human-machine AI collaboration tasks.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Large neural models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, raising concerns about whether their behavior reliably aligns with human values. Interpretability provides a route to internal transparency by revealing the computations that drive outputs. We argue that interpretability especially mechanistic approaches should be treated as a design principle for alignment, not an auxiliary diagnostic tool. Post-hoc methods such as LIME or SHAP offer intuitive but correlational explanations, while mechanistic techniques like circuit tracing or activation patching yield causal insight into internal failures, including deceptive or misaligned reasoning that behavioral methods like RLHF, red teaming, or Constitutional AI may overlook. Despite these advantages, interpretability faces challenges of scalability, epistemic uncertainty, and mismatches between learned representations and human concepts. Our position is that progress on safe and trustworthy AI will depend on making interpretability a first-class objective of AI research and development, ensuring that systems are not only effective but also auditable, transparent, and aligned with human intent.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

A large set of the explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) literature is emerging on feature relevance techniques to explain a deep neural network (DNN) output or explaining models that ingest image source data. However, assessing how XAI techniques can help understand models beyond classification tasks, e.g. for reinforcement learning (RL), has not been extensively studied. We review recent works in the direction to attain Explainable Reinforcement Learning (XRL), a relatively new subfield of Explainable Artificial Intelligence, intended to be used in general public applications, with diverse audiences, requiring ethical, responsible and trustable algorithms. In critical situations where it is essential to justify and explain the agent's behaviour, better explainability and interpretability of RL models could help gain scientific insight on the inner workings of what is still considered a black box. We evaluate mainly studies directly linking explainability to RL, and split these into two categories according to the way the explanations are generated: transparent algorithms and post-hoc explainaility. We also review the most prominent XAI works from the lenses of how they could potentially enlighten the further deployment of the latest advances in RL, in the demanding present and future of everyday problems.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have brought significant changes to various domains, especially through LLM-driven autonomous agents. These agents are now capable of collaborating seamlessly, splitting tasks and enhancing accuracy, thus minimizing the need for human involvement. However, these agents often approach a diverse range of tasks in isolation, without benefiting from past experiences. This isolation can lead to repeated mistakes and inefficient trials in task solving. To this end, this paper introduces Experiential Co-Learning, a novel framework in which instructor and assistant agents gather shortcut-oriented experiences from their historical trajectories and use these past experiences for mutual reasoning. This paradigm, enriched with previous experiences, equips agents to more effectively address unseen tasks.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Real-world requests to AI agents are fundamentally underspecified. Natural human communication relies on shared context and unstated constraints that speakers expect listeners to infer. Current agentic benchmarks test explicit instruction-following but fail to evaluate whether agents can reason about implicit requirements spanning accessibility needs, privacy boundaries, catastrophic risks, and contextual constraints. We present Implicit Intelligence, an evaluation framework testing whether AI agents can move beyond prompt-following to become genuine goal-fulfillers, paired with Agent-as-a-World (AaW), a harness where interactive worlds are defined in human-readable YAML files and simulated by language models. Our scenarios feature apparent simplicity in user requests, hidden complexity in correct solutions, and discoverability of constraints through environmental exploration. Evaluating 16 frontier and open-weight models across 205 scenarios, we find that even the best-performing model achieves only 48.3% scenario pass rate, revealing substantial room for improvement in bridging the gap between literal instruction-following and human-like contextual reasoning.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

The field of explainable AI (XAI) has quickly become a thriving and prolific community. However, a silent, recurrent and acknowledged issue in this area is the lack of consensus regarding its terminology. In particular, each new contribution seems to rely on its own (and often intuitive) version of terms like "explanation" and "interpretation". Such disarray encumbers the consolidation of advances in the field towards the fulfillment of scientific and regulatory demands e.g., when comparing methods or establishing their compliance with respect to biases and fairness constraints. We propose a theoretical framework that not only provides concrete definitions for these terms, but it also outlines all steps necessary to produce explanations and interpretations. The framework also allows for existing contributions to be re-contextualized such that their scope can be measured, thus making them comparable to other methods. We show that this framework is compliant with desiderata on explanations, on interpretability and on evaluation metrics. We present a use-case showing how the framework can be used to compare LIME, SHAP and MDNet, establishing their advantages and shortcomings. Finally, we discuss relevant trends in XAI as well as recommendations for future work, all from the standpoint of our framework.

With the increasing availability of structured and unstructured data and the swift progress of analytical techniques, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is bringing a revolution to the healthcare industry. With the increasingly indispensable role of AI in healthcare, there are growing concerns over the lack of transparency and explainability in addition to potential bias encountered by predictions of the model. This is where Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) comes into the picture. XAI increases the trust placed in an AI system by medical practitioners as well as AI researchers, and thus, eventually, leads to an increasingly widespread deployment of AI in healthcare. In this paper, we present different interpretability techniques. The aim is to enlighten practitioners on the understandability and interpretability of explainable AI systems using a variety of techniques available which can be very advantageous in the health-care domain. Medical diagnosis model is responsible for human life and we need to be confident enough to treat a patient as instructed by a black-box model. Our paper contains examples based on the heart disease dataset and elucidates on how the explainability techniques should be preferred to create trustworthiness while using AI systems in healthcare.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms frequently learn creative and unexpected solutions, surprising even expert researchers who develop and study them. They often astonish practitioners by discovering unanticipated behavior, exploiting loopholes in reward signals, or spontaneously uncovering previously unknown scientific phenomena. However, accounts of such unconventional behavior across machine learning are seldom formally documented. This work presents 26 curated firsthand anecdotes from various machine learning subfields representing the work of over 100 researchers. These anecdotes showcase the capability of modern AI systems to circumvent human-imposed design limitations and discover unexpected solutions to the tasks we train them on. Furthermore, these accounts are particularly important for the safety of future AI systems. They illustrate the fundamental challenge of aligning models with human values without diminishing their creativity, so they can make surprising discoveries without producing surprising, potentially harmful outcomes. The paper first details AI achieving superhuman success through reinforcement learning across many challenging domains. However, reward-driven optimization can fail when the model learns to hack an underspecified reward or unarticulated constraint. We then present case studies suggesting that harnessing internet-scale foundation models (FMs) has not resolved these fundamental challenges and, in fact, can supercharge them. Nevertheless, we argue that these same learning dynamics can be harnessed to accelerate scientific discovery. Finally, we hope this work provides a consolidated resource to inform future research and demonstrates that the tendency toward unexpected behaviors is commonplace in modern AI, highlighting the need to anticipate and manage AI's capacity for innovative, yet unpredictable, solutions. (abstract abridged)

Generative models based on variational autoencoders are a popular technique for detecting anomalies in images in a semi-supervised context. A common approach employs the anomaly score to detect the presence of anomalies, and it is known to reach high level of accuracy on benchmark datasets. However, since anomaly scores are computed from reconstruction disparities, they often obscure the detection of various spurious features, raising concerns regarding their actual efficacy. This case study explores the robustness of an anomaly detection system based on variational autoencoder generative models through the use of eXplainable AI methods. The goal is to get a different perspective on the real performances of anomaly detectors that use reconstruction differences. In our case study we discovered that, in many cases, samples are detected as anomalous for the wrong or misleading factors.

We present a case study in semi-autonomous mathematics discovery, using Gemini to systematically evaluate 700 conjectures labeled 'Open' in Bloom's Erdős Problems database. We employ a hybrid methodology: AI-driven natural language verification to narrow the search space, followed by human expert evaluation to gauge correctness and novelty. We address 13 problems that were marked 'Open' in the database: 5 through seemingly novel autonomous solutions, and 8 through identification of previous solutions in the existing literature. Our findings suggest that the 'Open' status of the problems was through obscurity rather than difficulty. We also identify and discuss issues arising in applying AI to math conjectures at scale, highlighting the difficulty of literature identification and the risk of ''subconscious plagiarism'' by AI. We reflect on the takeaways from AI-assisted efforts on the Erdős Problems.

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) models in real-world and high-risk applications has intensified the discussion about their trustworthiness and ethical usage, from both a technical and a legislative perspective. The field of eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) addresses this challenge by proposing explanations that bring to light the decision-making processes of complex black-box models. Despite being an essential property, the robustness of explanations is often an overlooked aspect during development: only robust explanation methods can increase the trust in the system as a whole. This paper investigates the role of robustness through the usage of a feature importance aggregation derived from multiple models (k-nearest neighbours, random forest and neural networks). Preliminary results showcase the potential in increasing the trustworthiness of the application, while leveraging multiple model's predictive power.

In recent years, the community of 'explainable artificial intelligence' (XAI) has created a vast body of methods to bridge a perceived gap between model 'complexity' and 'interpretability'. However, a concrete problem to be solved by XAI methods has not yet been formally stated. As a result, XAI methods are lacking theoretical and empirical evidence for the 'correctness' of their explanations, limiting their potential use for quality-control and transparency purposes. At the same time, Haufe et al. (2014) showed, using simple toy examples, that even standard interpretations of linear models can be highly misleading. Specifically, high importance may be attributed to so-called suppressor variables lacking any statistical relation to the prediction target. This behavior has been confirmed empirically for a large array of XAI methods in Wilming et al. (2022). Here, we go one step further by deriving analytical expressions for the behavior of a variety of popular XAI methods on a simple two-dimensional binary classification problem involving Gaussian class-conditional distributions. We show that the majority of the studied approaches will attribute non-zero importance to a non-class-related suppressor feature in the presence of correlated noise. This poses important limitations on the interpretations and conclusions that the outputs of these XAI methods can afford.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Abstract reasoning ability reflects the intelligence and generalization capacity of LLMs to extract and apply abstract rules. However, accurately measuring this ability remains challenging: existing benchmarks either rely on expensive manual annotation, limiting their scale, or risk measuring memorization rather than genuine reasoning. To address this, we introduce an automated pipeline named A2RBench, encompassing generation, expansion, evaluation, and analysis. Specifically, in the generation stage, LLMs create diverse tasks demanding genuine reasoning; in the expansion stage, LLMs reuse validated rules and expand new input spaces to generate task variations, achieving scaling. However, such a process may cause hallucinations. To eliminate it, we further establish a theoretical framework and prove that programmatic verification--testing whether the inverse operation perfectly reverses the forward operation (cycle consistency)--guarantees a unique solution. Through extensive evaluations on mainstream LLMs, we find: (1) Current LLMs exhibit fundamental deficiencies in abstract reasoning, with top models significantly underperforming humans on a representative subset (39.8% vs. 68.5%). (2) Current LLMs fall far short of 2D and 1D in the complexity of generated 3D tasks, revealing their lack of understanding of high-dimensional tasks. (3) Counterintuitively, inputs with higher information complexity can simplify the reasoning process.

Autonomous reasoning is among the most scientifically and economically motivating topics in AI today. Historically the purview of symbolic AI, recent advances have mainly emerged from deep probabilistic generative models. Despite immense interest and rapid progress, the generative AI community has not clearly converged on operational definitions for reasoning and often implicitly rejects the historical treatment of this topic in logic and verifiable automated reasoning. This position contends that definitional ambiguity leaves the construct validity of reasoning evaluation unverifiable, undermining quantifiable progress toward trustworthy autonomous reasoning. We also contend that this ambiguity is addressable. To that end, we provide (1) operational definitions based on a synthesis of the literature, positioning valid and sound reasoning as a learnable rule-based process; and (2) a checklist for best practices in the communication of AI reasoning research.

Human behavior simulation of AI agents necessitates the agents to possess a quality of believability, which is crucial as it facilitates users in establishing trust toward the agents and streamlines the fulfillment of the agents' goal. While recent advancements in Large Language Model (LLM) based agents have improved human behavior simulation, challenges inherent to LLMs (e.g., long context modeling) can undermine their believability. Consequently, evaluating AI agent believability becomes imperative. Unfortunately, prior research often neglects the negative impacts of LLM deficiencies. To address these gaps, we introduce two metrics for assessing LLM-based agent believability: consistency, and robustness, together with a benchmark, SimulateBench, with which, we evaluate the consistency and robustness of agents implemented with popular LLMs. We find that agents (i) struggle to accurately depict character information when presented with lengthy profile inputs; (ii) exhibit vulnerability to profile perturbations; and (iii) are significantly affected by certain key factors that impact their overall believability. Code and SimulateBench are public at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/GPTMan.

OpenAI's o3-preview reasoning model exceeded human accuracy on the ARC-AGI-1 benchmark, but does that mean state-of-the-art models recognize and reason with the abstractions the benchmark was designed to test? Here we investigate abstraction abilities of AI models using the closely related but simpler ConceptARC benchmark. Our evaluations vary input modality (textual vs. visual), use of external Python tools, and reasoning effort. Beyond output accuracy, we evaluate the natural-language rules that models generate to explain their solutions, enabling us to assess whether models recognize the abstractions that ConceptARC was designed to elicit. We show that the best models' rules are frequently based on surface-level ``shortcuts,'' capturing intended abstractions considerably less often than humans. In the visual modality, AI models' output accuracy drops sharply; however, our rule-level analysis reveals that a substantial share of their rules capture the intended abstractions, even as the models struggle to apply these concepts to generate correct solutions. In short, we show that using accuracy alone to evaluate abstract reasoning can substantially overestimate AI capabilities in textual modalities and underestimate it in visual modalities. Our results offer a more faithful picture of AI models' abstract reasoning abilities and a more principled way to track progress toward human-like, abstraction-centered intelligence.

Recent work suggests that large language models may implicitly learn world models. How should we assess this possibility? We formalize this question for the case where the underlying reality is governed by a deterministic finite automaton. This includes problems as diverse as simple logical reasoning, geographic navigation, game-playing, and chemistry. We propose new evaluation metrics for world model recovery inspired by the classic Myhill-Nerode theorem from language theory. We illustrate their utility in three domains: game playing, logic puzzles, and navigation. In all domains, the generative models we consider do well on existing diagnostics for assessing world models, but our evaluation metrics reveal their world models to be far less coherent than they appear. Such incoherence creates fragility: using a generative model to solve related but subtly different tasks can lead to failures. Building generative models that meaningfully capture the underlying logic of the domains they model would be immensely valuable; our results suggest new ways to assess how close a given model is to that goal.

The last decade has seen tremendous progress in our ability to generate realistic-looking data, be it images, text, audio, or video. Here, we discuss the closely related problem of quantifying realism, that is, designing functions that can reliably tell realistic data from unrealistic data. This problem turns out to be significantly harder to solve and remains poorly understood, despite its prevalence in machine learning and recent breakthroughs in generative AI. Drawing on insights from algorithmic information theory, we discuss why this problem is challenging, why a good generative model alone is insufficient to solve it, and what a good solution would look like. In particular, we introduce the notion of a universal critic, which unlike adversarial critics does not require adversarial training. While universal critics are not immediately practical, they can serve both as a North Star for guiding practical implementations and as a tool for analyzing existing attempts to capture realism.

Explainability is one of the key elements for building trust in AI systems. Among numerous attempts to make AI explainable, quantifying the effect of explanations remains a challenge in conducting human-AI collaborative tasks. Aside from the ability to predict the overall behavior of AI, in many applications, users need to understand an AI agent's competency in different aspects of the task domain. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of explanations on the user's mental model of AI agent competency within the task of visual question answering (VQA). We quantify users' understanding of competency, based on the correlation between the actual system performance and user rankings. We introduce an explainable VQA system that uses spatial and object features and is powered by the BERT language model. Each group of users sees only one kind of explanation to rank the competencies of the VQA model. The proposed model is evaluated through between-subject experiments to probe explanations' impact on the user's perception of competency. The comparison between two VQA models shows BERT based explanations and the use of object features improve the user's prediction of the model's competencies.

Intelligence appears under different names in different fields: as data compression in statistics and machine learning, as universal computation in dynamical systems, and as adaptive behavior in agents. Each field carries its own objective, and the two most influential drives often fail in mirror image: novelty search, which seeks surprise, is transfixed by a noisy television screen, while the free-energy principle, which avoids surprise, is most content in a dark room. Both failures have a single cause: each objective treats as one quantity the surprise a learner can convert into knowledge and the surprise it never can. Here we show that the learnable part of that information, which we call learnable novelty, yields the seemingly disparate projections of intelligence, and we give a closed-form estimator of it built on a cheap and differentiable reservoir computer. Used as a measure, with no supervision of any kind, the estimator recovers decades of complexity classification, ranking the Turing-complete rule~110 highest among the elementary cellular automata. Used as an objective, its gradient carries a neural cellular automaton from simple dynamics into a regime of solitons, the traveling, colliding structures by which rule~110 computes, as well as organizes the representation of an image encoder around the ten digit classes of MNIST, fully unsupervised: no label ever enters training. Handed to a reinforcement-learning agent as an intrinsic reward, it supplies the exploration that task rewards lack, improving on the task baseline in nine of ten environments and collapsing in none. Complexity generation, abstraction, and exploration, ordinarily pursued with unrelated objectives in separate fields, thus emerge from ascent on one differentiable quantity, and the projections of intelligence gain a common quantitative footing.

Tool-using agents often incur substantial computational cost due to long reasoning chains and iterative tool usage. In practical scenarios, many tasks become infeasible under constrained tool environments, where the capabilities required for successful task completion are unavailable. Detecting infeasible tasks and stopping execution early can significantly reduce unnecessary execution cost. In this work, we propose FeasiGen, an automatic pipeline for constructing infeasible agent tasks by identifying the critical tools required for successful task completion. Our approach extracts tool-calling traces from successful executions across multiple agent systems, identifies critical tools consistently shared across diverse execution strategies, and masks these tools to automatically transform solvable tasks into infeasible ones. Human verification confirms that the infeasibility annotations for our constructed tasks achieve over 94% accuracy. We further introduce feasibility-aware evaluation metrics for measuring whether agents can recognize infeasible tasks and stop execution appropriately. Extensive evaluations across nine models reveal substantially weak infeasibility detection ability, with false continue rate reaching up to 73.9%. We further observe that multi-agent architectures significantly reduce erroneous execution under infeasible conditions.

Test-time scaling has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) with remarkable reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematical domains, through intermediate chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before generating final answers. However, the specific sources and mechanisms underlying these reasoning capabilities remain insufficiently understood. Optimization reasoning, i.e. finding extrema under constraints, represents a fundamental abstraction that underpins critical applications in planning, control, resource allocation, and prompt search. To systematically evaluate this capability, we introduce ExtremBench, a benchmark dataset for solving mathematical extremal problems, curated from inequality exercises used for Chinese Mathematical Olympiad and transformed into 93 standardized extrema-finding problems. We conduct extensive evaluations across various state-of-the-art open-source model families, including the Qwen3, GPT-OSS, and DeepSeek. Our results reveal that LLMs' extremal-solving reasoning capabilities do not always align with those of current mathematical benchmarks such as AIME25 and MATH-500, with some models showing strong general mathematical reasoning but poor extremal-solving skills, and vice versa. This discrepancy highlights a critical gap in current evaluation practices and suggests that existing benchmarks may not comprehensively capture the full spectrum of mathematical reasoning abilities.

Case-based reasoning networks are machine-learning models that make predictions based on similarity between the input and prototypical parts of training samples, called prototypes. Such models are able to explain each decision by pointing to the prototypes that contributed the most to the final outcome. As the explanation is a core part of the prediction, they are often qualified as ``interpretable by design". While promising, we show that such explanations are sometimes misleading, which hampers their usefulness in safety-critical contexts. In particular, several instances may lead to different predictions and yet have the same explanation. Drawing inspiration from the field of formal eXplainable AI (FXAI), we propose Abductive Latent Explanations (ALEs), a formalism to express sufficient conditions on the intermediate (latent) representation of the instance that imply the prediction. Our approach combines the inherent interpretability of case-based reasoning models and the guarantees provided by formal XAI. We propose a solver-free and scalable algorithm for generating ALEs based on three distinct paradigms, compare them, and present the feasibility of our approach on diverse datasets for both standard and fine-grained image classification. The associated code can be found at https://github.com/julsoria/ale

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Amid a discussion about Green AI in which we see explainability neglected, we explore the possibility to efficiently approximate computationally expensive explainers. To this end, we propose feature attribution modelling with Empirical Explainers. Empirical Explainers learn from data to predict the attribution maps of expensive explainers. We train and test Empirical Explainers in the language domain and find that they model their expensive counterparts surprisingly well, at a fraction of the cost. They could thus mitigate the computational burden of neural explanations significantly, in applications that tolerate an approximation error.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

Ensuring safe and effective use of AI requires understanding and anticipating its performance on novel tasks, from advanced scientific challenges to transformed workplace activities. So far, benchmarking has guided progress in AI, but it has offered limited explanatory and predictive power for general-purpose AI systems, given the low transferability across diverse tasks. In this paper, we introduce general scales for AI evaluation that can explain what common AI benchmarks really measure, extract ability profiles of AI systems, and predict their performance for new task instances, in- and out-of-distribution. Our fully-automated methodology builds on 18 newly-crafted rubrics that place instance demands on general scales that do not saturate. Illustrated for 15 large language models and 63 tasks, high explanatory power is unleashed from inspecting the demand and ability profiles, bringing insights on the sensitivity and specificity exhibited by different benchmarks, and how knowledge, metacognition and reasoning are affected by model size, chain-of-thought and distillation. Surprisingly, high predictive power at the instance level becomes possible using these demand levels, providing superior estimates over black-box baseline predictors based on embeddings or finetuning, especially in out-of-distribution settings (new tasks and new benchmarks). The scales, rubrics, battery, techniques and results presented here represent a major step for AI evaluation, underpinning the reliable deployment of AI in the years ahead. (Collaborative platform: https://kinds-of-intelligence-cfi.github.io/ADELE.)

The ability to acknowledge the inevitable uncertainty in their knowledge and reasoning is a prerequisite for AI systems to be truly truthful and reliable. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of uncertainty specific to vision-language AI systems, distinguishing between epistemic uncertainty (arising from a lack of information) and aleatoric uncertainty (due to inherent unpredictability), and further explore finer categories within. Based on this taxonomy, we synthesize a benchmark dataset, CertainlyUncertain, featuring 178K visual question answering (VQA) samples as contrastive pairs. This is achieved by 1) inpainting images to make previously answerable questions into unanswerable ones; and 2) using image captions to prompt large language models for both answerable and unanswerable questions. Additionally, we introduce a new metric confidence-weighted accuracy, that is well correlated with both accuracy and calibration error, to address the shortcomings of existing metrics.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward (RLVR) has proven effective in improving Large Language Model's (LLM) reasoning ability. However, the learning dynamics of RLVR remain underexplored. In this paper, we reveal a counterintuitive phenomenon: among hard examples that the model initially struggles with, a substantial subset remains unlearnable even when correct rollouts are present. To understand the phenomenon, we first demonstrate that existing optimization and sampling techniques fail to resolve unlearnability. With cross-example gradient analysis, we show that unlearnable examples have fundamental representation issue, characterized by low gradient similarity with the rest of the examples and ungeneralizable reasoning patterns. We further show that representation flaws are difficult to mitigate in RL, as data augmentation does not improve gradient similarity. Our study provides the first systematic characterization of unlearnable data in RLVR training and reveals fundamental limitations in current RL approaches for reasoning tasks. Code and data are available at https://github.com/yulinchen99/unlearnability-rlvr.

We propose the AIMO Interpretability Challenge, a competition on distinguishing robust from spurious reasoning in frontier mathematical language models based on the models' internal mechanisms. The challenge is motivated by a central limitation of standard reasoning benchmarks: strong final-answer accuracy does not reveal whether a model relies on stable reasoning mechanisms or exploits brittle reasoning shortcuts. Building on AI Mathematical Olympiad (AIMO) problems and submissions, together with resources from the Fields Model Initiative, the competition will provide (1) newly-published olympiad-level math reasoning problems and their symbolic representations, allowing generation of novel functional variants, (2) access to frontier reasoning models, and (3) assessments of models' adversarial robustness on these problems. Participants will use these resources, along with our computing infrastructure support, to develop methods for identifying which models solve problems robustly. Our competition will also create a new, open robustness benchmark and baseline systems, aiming to provide a lasting foundation for standard benchmarking in mathematical reasoning and interpretability. Scientifically, the competition connects interpretability and generalization research around a central question in AI research: can we determine if, and to what extent, the decision-making of frontier AI models is generalizable and thus, reliable?

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Recent work by Anthropic on Mechanistic interpretability claims to understand and control Large Language Models by extracting human-interpretable features from their neural activation patterns using sparse autoencoders (SAEs). If successful, this approach offers one of the most promising routes for human oversight in AI safety. We conduct an initial stress-test of these claims by replicating their main results with open-source SAEs for Llama 3.1. While we successfully reproduce basic feature extraction and steering capabilities, our investigation suggests that major caution is warranted regarding the generalizability of these claims. We find that feature steering exhibits substantial fragility, with sensitivity to layer selection, steering magnitude, and context. We observe non-standard activation behavior and demonstrate the difficulty to distinguish thematically similar features from one another. While SAE-based interpretability produces compelling demonstrations in selected cases, current methods often fall short of the systematic reliability required for safety-critical applications. This suggests a necessary shift in focus from prioritizing interpretability of internal representations toward reliable prediction and control of model output. Our work contributes to a more nuanced understanding of what mechanistic interpretability has achieved and highlights fundamental challenges for AI safety that remain unresolved.

Explaining deep learning models is essential for clinical integration of medical image analysis systems. A good explanation highlights if a model depends on spurious features that undermines generalization and harms a subset of patients or, conversely, may present novel biological insights. Although techniques like GradCAM can identify influential features, they are measurement tools that do not themselves form an explanation. We propose a human-machine-VLM interaction system tailored to explaining classifiers in computational pathology, including multi-instance learning for whole-slide images. Our proof of concept comprises (1) an AI-integrated slide viewer to run sliding-window experiments to test claims of an explanation, and (2) quantification of an explanation's predictiveness using general-purpose vision-language models. The results demonstrate that this allows us to qualitatively test claims of explanations and can quantifiably distinguish competing explanations. This offers a practical path from explainable AI to explained AI in digital pathology and beyond. Code and prompts are available at https://github.com/nki-ai/x2x.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

As generative AI systems become competent and democratized in science, business, and government, deeper insight into their failure modes now poses an acute need. The occasional volatility in their behavior, such as the propensity of transformer models to hallucinate, impedes trust and adoption of emerging AI solutions in high-stakes areas. In the present work, we establish how and when hallucinations arise in pre-trained transformer models through concept representations captured by sparse autoencoders, under scenarios with experimentally controlled uncertainty in the input space. Our systematic experiments reveal that the number of semantic concepts used by the transformer model grows as the input information becomes increasingly unstructured. In the face of growing uncertainty in the input space, the transformer model becomes prone to activate coherent yet input-insensitive semantic features, leading to hallucinated output. At its extreme, for pure-noise inputs, we identify a wide variety of robustly triggered and meaningful concepts in the intermediate activations of pre-trained transformer models, whose functional integrity we confirm through targeted steering. We also show that hallucinations in the output of a transformer model can be reliably predicted from the concept patterns embedded in transformer layer activations. This collection of insights on transformer internal processing mechanics has immediate consequences for aligning AI models with human values, AI safety, opening the attack surface for potential adversarial attacks, and providing a basis for automatic quantification of a model's hallucination risk.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in solving math problems, a hallmark of human intelligence. Despite high success rates on current benchmarks; however, these often feature simple problems with only one or two unknowns, which do not sufficiently challenge their reasoning capacities. This paper introduces a novel benchmark, BeyondX, designed to address these limitations by incorporating problems with multiple unknowns. Recognizing the challenges in proposing multi-unknown problems from scratch, we developed BeyondX using an innovative automated pipeline that progressively increases complexity by expanding the number of unknowns in simpler problems. Empirical study on BeyondX reveals that the performance of existing LLMs, even those fine-tuned specifically on math tasks, significantly decreases as the number of unknowns increases - with a performance drop of up to 70\% observed in GPT-4. To tackle these challenges, we propose the Formulate-and-Solve strategy, a generalized prompting approach that effectively handles problems with an arbitrary number of unknowns. Our findings reveal that this strategy not only enhances LLM performance on the BeyondX benchmark but also provides deeper insights into the computational limits of LLMs when faced with more complex mathematical challenges.

Deep neural networks have shown excellent performances in many real-world applications. Unfortunately, they may show "Clever Hans"-like behavior---making use of confounding factors within datasets---to achieve high performance. In this work, we introduce the novel learning setting of "explanatory interactive learning" (XIL) and illustrate its benefits on a plant phenotyping research task. XIL adds the scientist into the training loop such that she interactively revises the original model via providing feedback on its explanations. Our experimental results demonstrate that XIL can help avoiding Clever Hans moments in machine learning and encourages (or discourages, if appropriate) trust into the underlying model.

Recent advances in foundation models have enabled AI scientists to automate increasingly complete research workflows, from hypothesis generation and code execution to manuscript preparation. Yet workflow coverage alone does not provide access to the full evidence on which scientific discovery depends. Existing systems typically reason over text, code, labels, or precomputed summaries, leaving scientifically decisive spatial, temporal, cross-channel, and procedural relations unavailable to the agent. We introduce OmniScientist, an end-to-end, omni-modal AI scientist that conducts multidisciplinary research directly from heterogeneous raw evidence. A perception layer and 3 autonomous agents for ideation, experiment, and writeup operate within a deterministic pipeline, allowing observations to shape research questions, experimental decisions, and final claims throughout the research lifecycle. By running idea, rigour, and claim checks in code, the system enforces novelty screening, statistical validity, execution provenance, and numerical traceability. We evaluate OmniScientist on 36 real-data cases spanning 5 discipline families, 4 families of scientific evidence, and modalities including images, signals, audio, video, 3-D structures, trajectories, tables, formulae, and graphs. The system completes the full path from raw data to a compiled manuscript in all 36 cases and achieves a mean overall paper score of 6.3 with the reference reasoning backbone. In paired comparisons against a blind variant that receives only precomputed scalar features, direct perception improves all 7 evaluation dimensions and wins 85% of head-to-head judgments. These results show that lifecycle-wide perception is essential for evidence-grounded scientific discovery and provides a practical path toward broadly capable AI scientists.

Physical interactions follow a long-tailed distribution: a set of common and regular interactions dominates human experience and visual data, while a broad spectrum of rare and irregular interactions remains underrepresented. Although recent visual world models, including image and video generation models, achieve impressive realism on existing benchmarks, they primarily focus on simulating common physical interactions. This raises a central question: Do current visual world models internalize and generalize physical principles? In this work, we introduce Tailor-Bench, a benchmark that challenges world models to simulate irregular physical interactions. To enable systematic evaluation, we design three scenario modes that progressively challenge model reasoning: Regular scenarios reflect common tool-task pairs, Unconventional scenarios replace conventional tools with attribute-compatible substitutes to test affordance generalization, and Impossible scenarios introduce attribute-violating tools to probe constraint awareness. Additionally, we design two complementary settings under a unified evaluation protocol: predictive generation requires inferring outcomes without guidance, while descriptive generation specifies the target outcome for faithful realization. Our experimental results reveal a clear long-tail gap in physical world modeling: performance degrades from Regular to Unconventional and Impossible scenarios, indicating limited generalization beyond common interactions. Failure analysis further shows that models rely on superficial visual patterns: image models fail to realize correct state changes, while video models further suffer from temporal inconsistencies.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

Generative Artificial Intelligence is emerging as an important technology, promising to be transformative in many areas. At the same time, generative AI techniques are based on sampling from probabilistic models, and by default, they come with no guarantees about correctness, safety, fairness, or other properties. Statistical methods offer a promising potential approach to improve the reliability of generative AI techniques. In addition, statistical methods are also promising for improving the quality and efficiency of AI evaluation, as well as for designing interventions and experiments in AI. In this paper, we review some of the existing work on these topics, explaining both the general statistical techniques used, as well as their applications to generative AI. We also discuss limitations and potential future directions.

For many real-world systems, causal ground truth is difficult to obtain, making claims about causal effects hard to assess. We develop methods for evaluating collections of n{2} bivariate causal statements over a set of n variables. In the setting of acyclic linear statements, any such collection can be extended to a unique multivariate causal model, but we argue that this induced model is implausible if it imposes substantial additional confounding to explain observed correlations. We introduce a compatibility score that quantifies this notion of plausibility, notably without relying on the faithfulness assumption. Additionally, we define an incompatibility score for purely graphical bivariate causal statements, based on global consistency constraints that are derived from acyclicity and faithfulness assumptions. We give theoretical and empirical evidence that both scores can successfully distinguish correct from incorrect causal statements in generic settings. Moreover, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our methods by analyzing causal claims made by large language models. Our work aims to provide a foundation for assessing the reliability of causal information derived from human experts or artificial intelligence in settings where alternative forms of validation are unavailable.

World models for embodied AI must be physically viable: constructed to answer intervention queries by representing the physical structure governing action outcomes, rather than merely predicting future observations. Existing observation-predictive world models can produce visually plausible but physically wrong rollouts. This failure is structural; distinct physical systems can look identical yet diverge under intervention. We expose this problem with controlled benchmarks that fix the visible scene while varying latent physics. We show that such models may recommend infeasible actions, mispredict interaction outcomes, or certify unsafe behavior. We argue that embodied AI requires world models that identify the simplest physical abstraction sufficient to answer an intervention query. Such a model comprises modular components, including environment representation, latent state and parameter estimation, action specification, interventional dynamics, and query-level response. An autonomous orchestrator should identify the relevant abstraction and compose compatible learned and structured components per query. When closed-form physics is unavailable, uncertain, or costly, the transition model may be analytic, simulated, learned, or hybrid, but it must preserve the structure that determines interventional outcomes. This decomposition makes the model interpretable, its components verifiable, and its outputs auditable against the query. It also provides a design principle for new world models and a feasibility test for existing ones: the right abstraction is not the most detailed model of the world, but the simplest model that preserves the distinctions relevant to the query. We demonstrate this approach on queries that existing systems fail to answer correctly, and outline how an orchestrator can dynamically assemble and adapt physically viable models for planning, control, and verification.

Creativity serves as a cornerstone for societal progress and innovation, but its assessment remains a complex and often subjective endeavor. With the rise of advanced generative AI models capable of tasks once reserved for human creativity, the study of AI's creative potential becomes imperative for its responsible development and application. This paper addresses the complexities in defining and evaluating creativity by introducing a new concept called Relative Creativity. Instead of trying to define creativity universally, we shift the focus to whether AI can match the creative abilities of a hypothetical human. This perspective draws inspiration from the Turing Test, expanding upon it to address the challenges and subjectivities inherent in evaluating creativity. This methodological shift facilitates a statistically quantifiable evaluation of AI's creativity, which we term Statistical Creativity. This approach allows for direct comparisons of AI's creative abilities with those of specific human groups. Building on this foundation, we discuss the application of statistical creativity in contemporary prompt-conditioned autoregressive models. In addition to defining and analyzing a measure of creativity, we introduce an actionable training guideline, effectively bridging the gap between theoretical quantification of creativity and practical model training. Through these multifaceted contributions, the paper establishes a cohesive, continuously evolving, and transformative framework for assessing and fostering statistical creativity in AI models.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

Although demonstrating remarkable performance on reasoning tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) still tend to fabricate unreliable responses when confronted with problems that are unsolvable or beyond their capability, severely undermining the reliability. Prior studies of LLM reliability have primarily focused on knowledge tasks to identify unanswerable questions, while mathematical reasoning tasks have remained unexplored due to the dearth of unsolvable math problems. To systematically investigate LLM reliability in mathematical reasoning tasks, we formulate the reliability evaluation for both solvable and unsolvable problems. We then develop a ReliableMath dataset which incorporates open-source solvable problems and high-quality unsolvable problems synthesized by our proposed construction workflow with human evaluations. Experiments are conducted on various LLMs with several key findings uncovered. LLMs fail to directly identify unsolvable problems and always generate fabricated responses. When instructing LLMs to indicate unsolvability using a reliable prompt, the reliability of larger-sized LLMs remains on solvable problems, but notably improves on unsolvable problems yet still falls short of solvable problems. However, small LLMs rarely show any progress despite employing reliable prompts. Therefore, we further propose an alignment strategy to enhance small LLMs' reliability, which can significantly improve LLM reliability performances on both in-domain and out-of-domain tasks.

The rapid emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has precipitated a profound paradigm shift in Artificial Intelligence, delivering monumental engineering successes that increasingly impact modern society. However, a critical paradox persists within the current field: despite the empirical efficacy, our theoretical understanding of LLMs remains disproportionately nascent, forcing these systems to be treated largely as ``black boxes''. To address this theoretical fragmentation, this survey proposes a unified lifecycle-based taxonomy that organizes the research landscape into six distinct stages: Data Preparation, Model Preparation, Training, Alignment, Inference, and Evaluation. Within this framework, we provide a systematic review of the foundational theories and internal mechanisms driving LLM performance. Specifically, we analyze core theoretical issues such as the mathematical justification for data mixtures, the representational limits of various architectures, and the optimization dynamics of alignment algorithms. Moving beyond current best practices, we identify critical frontier challenges, including the theoretical limits of synthetic data self-improvement, the mathematical bounds of safety guarantees, and the mechanistic origins of emergent intelligence. By connecting empirical observations with rigorous scientific inquiry, this work provides a structured roadmap for transitioning LLM development from engineering heuristics toward a principled scientific discipline.

Recent years have seen the employment of a plethora of machine learning (ML) models in high-stakes domains, but they remain largely opaque to the practitioners who act on their predictions. While post-hoc explanation methods offer a lens into this model behavior, wielding them effectively demands expertise most domain experts lack: navigating high-dimensional outputs, selecting the best explanations, and synthesizing evidence across disparate tools. To this end, we present MEA, a multi-agent framework that removes the explanation knowledge barrier entirely: a Proposer agent selects and configures explanation tools based on the question and modality, while an Actor agent is optimized end-to-end against faithfulness, transforming the outputs into natural language explanations grounded in model behavior across tabular, text, and vision modalities. Further, we introduce diverse question types spanning feature attribution, counterfactual reasoning, and spurious feature detection, each paired with a perturbation-based faithfulness metric. We find that frontier LLMs systematically produce unfaithful explanations. By optimizing against faithfulness rewards augmented with a modality-adaptive penalty, MEA consistently outperforms post hoc explainers, agentic, and closed-source baselines across six datasets, with reward-driven optimization yielding faithfulness gains of +28% (tabular), +21% (text), and +34% (vision) over the untrained backbone. More broadly, our findings suggest that AI agents themselves can serve as a scalable, adaptable interface to ML explainability, opening a path toward natural-language explainability that generalizes beyond the fixed, single-purpose tools that have long defined the field.

Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine learning based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this paper, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations, a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

Background: The field of Artificial Intelligence has undergone cyclical periods of growth and decline, known as AI summers and winters. Currently, we are in the third AI summer, characterized by significant advancements and commercialization, particularly in the integration of Symbolic AI and Sub-Symbolic AI, leading to the emergence of Neuro-Symbolic AI. Methods: The review followed the PRISMA methodology, utilizing databases such as IEEE Explore, Google Scholar, arXiv, ACM, and SpringerLink. The inclusion criteria targeted peer-reviewed papers published between 2020 and 2024. Papers were screened for relevance to Neuro-Symbolic AI, with further inclusion based on the availability of associated codebases to ensure reproducibility. Results: From an initial pool of 1,428 papers, 167 met the inclusion criteria and were analyzed in detail. The majority of research efforts are concentrated in the areas of learning and inference (63%), logic and reasoning (35%), and knowledge representation (44%). Explainability and trustworthiness are less represented (28%), with Meta-Cognition being the least explored area (5%). The review identifies significant interdisciplinary opportunities, particularly in integrating explainability and trustworthiness with other research areas. Conclusion: Neuro-Symbolic AI research has seen rapid growth since 2020, with concentrated efforts in learning and inference. Significant gaps remain in explainability, trustworthiness, and Meta-Cognition. Addressing these gaps through interdisciplinary research will be crucial for advancing the field towards more intelligent, reliable, and context-aware AI systems.

Explainable AI (XAI) in medical histopathology is essential for enhancing the interpretability and clinical trustworthiness of deep learning models in cancer diagnosis. However, the black-box nature of these models often limits their clinical adoption. We introduce GRAPHITE (Graph-based Interpretable Tissue Examination), a post-hoc explainable framework designed for breast cancer tissue microarray (TMA) analysis. GRAPHITE employs a multiscale approach, extracting patches at various magnification levels, constructing an hierarchical graph, and utilising graph attention networks (GAT) with scalewise attention (SAN) to capture scale-dependent features. We trained the model on 140 tumour TMA cores and four benign whole slide images from which 140 benign samples were created, and tested it on 53 pathologist-annotated TMA samples. GRAPHITE outperformed traditional XAI methods, achieving a mean average precision (mAP) of 0.56, an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) of 0.94, and a threshold robustness (ThR) of 0.70, indicating that the model maintains high performance across a wide range of thresholds. In clinical utility, GRAPHITE achieved the highest area under the decision curve (AUDC) of 4.17e+5, indicating reliable decision support across thresholds. These results highlight GRAPHITE's potential as a clinically valuable tool in computational pathology, providing interpretable visualisations that align with the pathologists' diagnostic reasoning and support precision medicine.

This position paper emphasizes the critical gap in the evaluation of Explainable AI (XAI) due to the lack of standardized and reliable metrics, which diminishes its practical value, trustworthiness, and ability to meet regulatory requirements. Current evaluation methods are often fragmented, subjective, and biased, making them prone to manipulation and complicating the assessment of complex models. A central issue is the absence of a ground truth for explanations, complicating comparisons across various XAI approaches. To address these challenges, we advocate for widespread research into developing robust, context-sensitive evaluation metrics. These metrics should be resistant to manipulation, relevant to each use case, and based on human judgment and real-world applicability. We also recommend creating domain-specific evaluation benchmarks that align with the user and regulatory needs of sectors such as healthcare and finance. By encouraging collaboration among academia, industry, and regulators, we can create standards that balance flexibility and consistency, ensuring XAI explanations are meaningful, trustworthy, and compliant with evolving regulations.

Situational awareness, the capacity of an AI system to recognize its own nature, understand its training and deployment context, and reason strategically about its circumstances, is widely considered among the most dangerous emergent capabilities in advanced AI systems. Separately, a growing research effort seeks to improve the logical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) across deduction, induction, and abduction. In this paper, we argue that these two research trajectories are on a collision course. We introduce the RAISE framework (Reasoning Advancing Into Self Examination), which identifies three mechanistic pathways through which improvements in logical reasoning enable progressively deeper levels of situational awareness: deductive self inference, inductive context recognition, and abductive self modeling. We formalize each pathway, construct an escalation ladder from basic self recognition to strategic deception, and demonstrate that every major research topic in LLM logical reasoning maps directly onto a specific amplifier of situational awareness. We further analyze why current safety measures are insufficient to prevent this escalation. We conclude by proposing concrete safeguards, including a "Mirror Test" benchmark and a Reasoning Safety Parity Principle, and pose an uncomfortable but necessary question to the logical reasoning community about its responsibility in this trajectory.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have opened new avenues for accelerating scientific research. While models are increasingly capable of assisting with routine tasks, their ability to contribute to novel, expert-level mathematical discovery is less understood. We present a collection of case studies demonstrating how researchers have successfully collaborated with advanced AI models, specifically Google's Gemini-based models (in particular Gemini Deep Think and its advanced variants), to solve open problems, refute conjectures, and generate new proofs across diverse areas in theoretical computer science, as well as other areas such as economics, optimization, and physics. Based on these experiences, we extract common techniques for effective human-AI collaboration in theoretical research, such as iterative refinement, problem decomposition, and cross-disciplinary knowledge transfer. While the majority of our results stem from this interactive, conversational methodology, we also highlight specific instances that push beyond standard chat interfaces. These include deploying the model as a rigorous adversarial reviewer to detect subtle flaws in existing proofs, and embedding it within a "neuro-symbolic" loop that autonomously writes and executes code to verify complex derivations. Together, these examples highlight the potential of AI not just as a tool for automation, but as a versatile, genuine partner in the creative process of scientific discovery.

Despite the proliferation of explainable AI (XAI) methods, little is understood about end-users' explainability needs and behaviors around XAI explanations. To address this gap and contribute to understanding how explainability can support human-AI interaction, we conducted a mixed-methods study with 20 end-users of a real-world AI application, the Merlin bird identification app, and inquired about their XAI needs, uses, and perceptions. We found that participants desire practically useful information that can improve their collaboration with the AI, more so than technical system details. Relatedly, participants intended to use XAI explanations for various purposes beyond understanding the AI's outputs: calibrating trust, improving their task skills, changing their behavior to supply better inputs to the AI, and giving constructive feedback to developers. Finally, among existing XAI approaches, participants preferred part-based explanations that resemble human reasoning and explanations. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for future XAI design.

AI agents are increasingly deployed to execute important tasks. While rising accuracy scores on standard benchmarks suggest rapid progress, many agents still continue to fail in practice. This discrepancy highlights a fundamental limitation of current evaluations: compressing agent behavior into a single success metric obscures critical operational flaws. Notably, it ignores whether agents behave consistently across runs, withstand perturbations, fail predictably, or have bounded error severity. Grounded in safety-critical engineering, we provide a holistic performance profile by proposing twelve concrete metrics that decompose agent reliability along four key dimensions: consistency, robustness, predictability, and safety. Evaluating 14 agentic models across two complementary benchmarks, we find that recent capability gains have only yielded small improvements in reliability. By exposing these persistent limitations, our metrics complement traditional evaluations while offering tools for reasoning about how agents perform, degrade, and fail.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

As machine learning models evolve, maintaining transparency demands more human-centric explainable AI techniques. Counterfactual explanations, with roots in human reasoning, identify the minimal input changes needed to obtain a given output and, hence, are crucial for supporting decision-making. Despite their importance, the evaluation of these explanations often lacks grounding in user studies and remains fragmented, with existing metrics not fully capturing human perspectives. To address this challenge, we developed a diverse set of 30 counterfactual scenarios and collected ratings across 8 evaluation metrics from 206 respondents. Subsequently, we fine-tuned different Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict average or individual human judgment across these metrics. Our methodology allowed LLMs to achieve an accuracy of up to 63% in zero-shot evaluations and 85% (over a 3-classes prediction) with fine-tuning across all metrics. The fine-tuned models predicting human ratings offer better comparability and scalability in evaluating different counterfactual explanation frameworks.

Chomsky and others have very directly claimed that large language models (LLMs) are equally capable of learning languages that are possible and impossible for humans to learn. However, there is very little published experimental evidence to support such a claim. Here, we develop a set of synthetic impossible languages of differing complexity, each designed by systematically altering English data with unnatural word orders and grammar rules. These languages lie on an impossibility continuum: at one end are languages that are inherently impossible, such as random and irreversible shuffles of English words, and on the other, languages that may not be intuitively impossible but are often considered so in linguistics, particularly those with rules based on counting word positions. We report on a wide range of evaluations to assess the capacity of GPT-2 small models to learn these uncontroversially impossible languages, and crucially, we perform these assessments at various stages throughout training to compare the learning process for each language. Our core finding is that GPT-2 struggles to learn impossible languages when compared to English as a control, challenging the core claim. More importantly, we hope our approach opens up a productive line of inquiry in which different LLM architectures are tested on a variety of impossible languages in an effort to learn more about how LLMs can be used as tools for these cognitive and typological investigations.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Interpretability and explainability of deep neural networks are challenging due to their scale, complexity, and the agreeable notions on which the explaining process rests. Previous work, in particular, has focused on representing internal components of neural networks through human-friendly visuals and concepts. On the other hand, in real life, when making a decision, human tends to rely on similar situations and/or associations in the past. Hence arguably, a promising approach to make the model transparent is to design it in a way such that the model explicitly connects the current sample with the seen ones, and bases its decision on these samples. Grounded on that principle, we propose in this paper an explainable, evidence-based memory network architecture, which learns to summarize the dataset and extract supporting evidences to make its decision. Our model achieves state-of-the-art performance on two popular question answering datasets (i.e. TrecQA and WikiQA). Via further analysis, we show that this model can reliably trace the errors it has made in the validation step to the training instances that might have caused these errors. We believe that this error-tracing capability provides significant benefit in improving dataset quality in many applications.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

Counterfactual reasoning, a hallmark of intelligence, consists of three steps: inferring latent variables from observations (abduction), constructing alternatives (interventions), and predicting their outcomes (prediction). This skill is essential for advancing LLMs' causal understanding and expanding their applications in high-stakes domains such as scientific research. However, existing efforts in assessing LLM's counterfactual reasoning capabilities tend to skip the abduction step, effectively reducing to interventional reasoning and leading to overestimation of LLM performance. To address this, we introduce executable counterfactuals, a novel framework that operationalizes causal reasoning through code and math problems. Our framework explicitly requires all three steps of counterfactual reasoning and enables scalable synthetic data creation with varying difficulty, creating a frontier for evaluating and improving LLM's reasoning. Our results reveal substantial drop in accuracy (25-40%) from interventional to counterfactual reasoning for SOTA models like o4-mini and Claude-4-Sonnet. To address this gap, we construct a training set comprising counterfactual code problems having if-else condition and test on out-of-domain code structures (e.g. having while-loop); we also test whether a model trained on code would generalize to counterfactual math word problems. While supervised finetuning on stronger models' reasoning traces improves in-domain performance of Qwen models, it leads to a decrease in accuracy on OOD tasks such as counterfactual math problems. In contrast, reinforcement learning induces the core cognitive behaviors and generalizes to new domains, yielding gains over the base model on both code (improvement of 1.5x-2x) and math problems. Analysis of the reasoning traces reinforces these findings and highlights the promise of RL for improving LLMs' counterfactual reasoning.

AI applications driven by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are prone to hallucinations and pose considerable risks to human users. Crucially, such hallucinations are not equally problematic: some hallucination contents could be detected by human users(i.e., obvious hallucinations), while others are often missed or require more verification effort(i.e., elusive hallucinations). This indicates that multimodal AI hallucinations vary significantly in their verifiability. Yet, little research has explored how to control this property for AI applications with diverse security and usability demands. To address this gap, we construct a dataset from 4,470 human responses to AI-generated hallucinations and categorize these hallucinations into obvious and elusive types based on their verifiability by human users. Further, we propose an activation-space intervention method that learns separate probes for obvious and elusive hallucinations. We reveal that obvious and elusive hallucinations elicit different intervention probes, allowing for fine-grained control over the model's verifiability. Empirical results demonstrate the efficacy of this approach and show that targeted interventions yield superior performance in regulating corresponding verifiability. Moreover, simply mixing these interventions enables flexible control over the verifiability required for different scenarios.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

In-Context Learning (ICL) is an essential emergent ability of Large Language Models (LLMs), and recent studies introduce Chain-of-Thought (CoT) to exemplars of ICL to enhance the reasoning capability, especially in mathematics tasks. However, given the continuous advancement of model capabilities, it remains unclear whether CoT exemplars still benefit recent, stronger models in such tasks. Through systematic experiments, we find that for recent strong models such as the Qwen2.5 series, adding traditional CoT exemplars does not improve reasoning performance compared to Zero-Shot CoT. Instead, their primary function is to align the output format with human expectations. We further investigate the effectiveness of enhanced CoT exemplars, constructed using answers from advanced models such as Qwen2.5-Max and DeepSeek-R1. Experimental results indicate that these enhanced exemplars still fail to improve the model's reasoning performance. Further analysis reveals that models tend to ignore the exemplars and focus primarily on the instructions, leading to no observable gain in reasoning ability. Overall, our findings highlight the limitations of the current ICL+CoT framework in mathematical reasoning, calling for a re-examination of the ICL paradigm and the definition of exemplars.

In recent years there has been a tremendous surge in the general capabilities of AI systems, mainly fuelled by training foundation models on internetscale data. Nevertheless, the creation of openended, ever self-improving AI remains elusive. In this position paper, we argue that the ingredients are now in place to achieve openendedness in AI systems with respect to a human observer. Furthermore, we claim that such open-endedness is an essential property of any artificial superhuman intelligence (ASI). We begin by providing a concrete formal definition of open-endedness through the lens of novelty and learnability. We then illustrate a path towards ASI via open-ended systems built on top of foundation models, capable of making novel, humanrelevant discoveries. We conclude by examining the safety implications of generally-capable openended AI. We expect that open-ended foundation models will prove to be an increasingly fertile and safety-critical area of research in the near future.

Can AI make progress on important, unsolved mathematical problems? Large language models are now capable of sophisticated mathematical and scientific reasoning, but whether they can perform novel research is still widely debated and underexplored. We introduce HorizonMath, a benchmark of over 100 predominantly unsolved problems spanning 8 domains in computational and applied mathematics, paired with an open-source evaluation framework for automated verification. Our benchmark targets a class of problems where discovery is hard, requiring meaningful mathematical insight, but verification is computationally efficient and simple. Because these solutions are unknown, HorizonMath is immune to data contamination, and most state-of-the-art models score near 0%. Existing research-level benchmarks instead rely on formal proof verification or manual review, both of which are expensive to scale. Using this platform, we find two problems for which GPT 5.4 Pro proposes solutions that improve on the best-known published results, representing potential novel contributions (pending expert review). We release HorizonMath as an open challenge and a growing community resource, where correct solutions to problems in the unsolved problem classes could constitute novel results in the mathematical literature.

The field of Explainable AI (XAI) is seeking to shed light on the inner workings of complex AI models and uncover the rationale behind their decisions. One of the models gaining attention are probabilistic circuits (PCs), which are a general and unified framework for tractable probabilistic models that support efficient computation of various probabilistic queries. Probabilistic circuits guarantee inference that is polynomial in the size of the circuit. In this paper, we improve the explainability of probabilistic circuits by computing a comprehensible, readable logical theory that covers the high-density regions generated by a PC. To achieve this, pruning approaches based on generative significance are used in a new method called PUTPUT (Probabilistic circuit Understanding Through Pruning Underlying logical Theories). The method is applied to a real world use case where music playlists are automatically generated and expressed as readable (database) queries. Evaluation shows that this approach can effectively produce a comprehensible logical theory that describes the high-density regions of a PC and outperforms state of the art methods when exploring the performance-comprehensibility trade-off.

Neural networks often pack many unrelated concepts into a single neuron - a puzzling phenomenon known as 'polysemanticity' which makes interpretability much more challenging. This paper provides a toy model where polysemanticity can be fully understood, arising as a result of models storing additional sparse features in "superposition." We demonstrate the existence of a phase change, a surprising connection to the geometry of uniform polytopes, and evidence of a link to adversarial examples. We also discuss potential implications for mechanistic interpretability.

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

We introduce a novel framework for incorporating human expertise into algorithmic predictions. Our approach leverages human judgment to distinguish inputs which are algorithmically indistinguishable, or "look the same" to predictive algorithms. We argue that this framing clarifies the problem of human-AI collaboration in prediction tasks, as experts often form judgments by drawing on information which is not encoded in an algorithm's training data. Algorithmic indistinguishability yields a natural test for assessing whether experts incorporate this kind of "side information", and further provides a simple but principled method for selectively incorporating human feedback into algorithmic predictions. We show that this method provably improves the performance of any feasible algorithmic predictor and precisely quantify this improvement. We find empirically that although algorithms often outperform their human counterparts on average, human judgment can improve algorithmic predictions on specific instances (which can be identified ex-ante). In an X-ray classification task, we find that this subset constitutes nearly 30% of the patient population. Our approach provides a natural way of uncovering this heterogeneity and thus enabling effective human-AI collaboration.

There is a substantial body of literature examining the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), particularly their performance on precise arithmetic operations in autoregressive architectures. However, their ability to perform approximate reasoning in informal, fast-paced mathematical operations has received far less attention, especially among non-autoregressive decoder models. Our work addresses this gap by introducing StreetMath, a benchmark designed to evaluate models' approximation abilities under real-world approximation scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations across different LLM architectures: Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507, Qwen3-4B-Thinking-2507, Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, Falcon-Mamba-7B-Instruct, and Mamba-GPT-3B. Furthermore, we apply mechanistic interpretability techniques to probe their internal computational states. Our analysis reveals that LLMs generally attempt to compute exact values or invoke external tools even in tasks that call for approximation. Moreover, while models sometimes reach the correct answer in early layers or steps, they still consume more tokens when solving approximation tasks. Additional experiments indicate that exact and approximate arithmetic operations rely on largely separate neural components. Drawing upon research on cognitive psychology, we argue that LLMs do not exhibit cognitive miserliness in the same way humans do in street math settings. We open source our work https://github.com/ctseng777/StreetMath

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

While the evaluation of explanations is an important step towards trustworthy models, it needs to be done carefully, and the employed metrics need to be well-understood. Specifically model randomization testing is often overestimated and regarded as a sole criterion for selecting or discarding certain explanation methods. To address shortcomings of this test, we start by observing an experimental gap in the ranking of explanation methods between randomization-based sanity checks [1] and model output faithfulness measures (e.g. [25]). We identify limitations of model-randomization-based sanity checks for the purpose of evaluating explanations. Firstly, we show that uninformative attribution maps created with zero pixel-wise covariance easily achieve high scores in this type of checks. Secondly, we show that top-down model randomization preserves scales of forward pass activations with high probability. That is, channels with large activations have a high probility to contribute strongly to the output, even after randomization of the network on top of them. Hence, explanations after randomization can only be expected to differ to a certain extent. This explains the observed experimental gap. In summary, these results demonstrate the inadequacy of model-randomization-based sanity checks as a criterion to rank attribution methods.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems, and Large Language Models (LLMs) in particular, are increasingly employed for creative tasks like scientific idea generation, constituting a form of generalization from training data unaddressed by existing conceptual frameworks. Despite its similarities to compositional generalization (CG), combinatorial creativity (CC) is an open-ended ability. Instead of evaluating for accuracy or correctness against fixed targets, which would contradict the open-ended nature of CC, we propose a theoretical framework and algorithmic task for evaluating outputs by their degrees of novelty and utility. From here, we make several important empirical contributions: (1) We obtain the first insights into the scaling behavior of creativity for LLMs. (2) We discover that, for fixed compute budgets, there exist optimal model depths and widths for creative ability. (3) We find that the ideation-execution gap, whereby LLMs excel at generating novel scientific ideas but struggle to ensure their practical feasibility, may be explained by a more fundamental novelty-utility tradeoff characteristic of creativity algorithms in general. Importantly, this tradeoff remains persistent even at scale, casting doubt on the long-term creative potential of LLMs in their current form. Together, our conceptual framework and empirical findings provide a foundation for understanding and improving creativity in modern AI models, bridging the gap between human and machine intelligence.

As AI becomes more capable, we entrust it with more general and consequential tasks. The risks from failure grow more severe with increasing task scope. It is therefore important to understand how extremely capable AI models will fail: Will they fail by systematically pursuing goals we do not intend? Or will they fail by being a hot mess, and taking nonsensical actions that do not further any goal? We operationalize this question using a bias-variance decomposition of the errors made by AI models: An AI's incoherence on a task is measured over test-time randomness as the fraction of its error that stems from variance rather than bias in task outcome. Across all tasks and frontier models we measure, the longer models spend reasoning and taking actions, the more incoherent their failures become. Incoherence changes with model scale in a way that is experiment dependent. However, in several settings, larger, more capable models are more incoherent than smaller models. Consequently, scale alone seems unlikely to eliminate incoherence. Instead, as more capable AIs pursue harder tasks, requiring more sequential action and thought, our results predict failures to be accompanied by more incoherent behavior. This suggests a future where AIs sometimes cause industrial accidents (due to unpredictable misbehavior), but are less likely to exhibit consistent pursuit of a misaligned goal. This increases the relative importance of alignment research targeting reward hacking or goal misspecification.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We identify that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) pairs to the system. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis.

The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus remains one of the most compelling and challenging benchmarks for tracking progress toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence. In contrast to other evaluation datasets designed to assess an agent's task-specific skills or accumulated knowledge, the ARC-AGI suite is specifically targeted at measuring skill acquisition efficiency, a trait that has (so far) been lacking in even the most sophisticated machine learning systems. For algorithms that require extensive intra-task exemplars, a significant constraint imposed by ARC-AGI is the modest cardinality of its demonstration set, comprising a small number of langle input, output rangle grids per task specifying the corresponding transformation. To embellish the space of viable sample pairs, this paper introduces ARC-GEN, an open-source procedural generator aimed at extending the original ARC-AGI training dataset as faithfully as possible. Unlike prior efforts, our generator is both exhaustive (covering all four-hundred tasks) and mimetic (more closely honoring the distributional properties and characteristics embodied in the initial ARC-AGI-1 release). We also discuss the use of this generator in establishing a static benchmark suite to verify the correctness of programs submitted to the 2025 Google Code Golf Championship.

Student simulation can support learning-by-teaching pedagogy where human students (as tutors) teach AI-simulated novice students (as tutees). Recent research often relies on prompt engineering with large language models (LLMs) to simulate novice student behaviour, but it is difficult to keep the AI-simulated student at a stable novice knowledge level. A key reason is that many LLMs are trained to be broadly capable, so even when prompted to "act like a novice," the LLMs can still produce expert-level explanations during the learning-by-teaching interaction process. As a result, the AI-simulated student may drift beyond the intended knowledge level, reducing the credibility of the simulation for studying learning-by-teaching processes. Thus, we propose a knowledge-level simulation approach based on machine unlearning. We investigate this approach using a dataset of multiple-choice questions on Python programming concepts. We apply machine unlearning to transform a knowledgeable LLM into a novice-level AI student (i.e., teachable agent), then evaluate whether the teachable agent can relearn targeted knowledge components through learning-by-teaching dialogue interactions. Finally, we analyse the dialogue logs to characterise how the agent's behaviour changes over time, including its question asking, error patterns, and responsiveness to instruction. The results show that (1) unlearning produces simulated student agents with more novice-like responses than prompt-only baselines, (2) the agents recover a measurable portion of the unlearned knowledge under structured exposure, and (3) dialogue analyses reveal identifiable trajectories of conceptual change and teaching moves that predict learning recovery.

Methods for understanding the decisions of and mechanisms underlying deep neural networks (DNNs) typically rely on building intuition by emphasizing sensory or semantic features of individual examples. For instance, methods aim to visualize the components of an input which are "important" to a network's decision, or to measure the semantic properties of single neurons. Here, we argue that interpretability research suffers from an over-reliance on intuition-based approaches that risk-and in some cases have caused-illusory progress and misleading conclusions. We identify a set of limitations that we argue impede meaningful progress in interpretability research, and examine two popular classes of interpretability methods-saliency and single-neuron-based approaches-that serve as case studies for how overreliance on intuition and lack of falsifiability can undermine interpretability research. To address these concerns, we propose a strategy to address these impediments in the form of a framework for strongly falsifiable interpretability research. We encourage researchers to use their intuitions as a starting point to develop and test clear, falsifiable hypotheses, and hope that our framework yields robust, evidence-based interpretability methods that generate meaningful advances in our understanding of DNNs.

The field of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to uncover the inner workings of complex deep neural models. While being crucial for safety-critical domains, XAI inherently lacks ground-truth explanations, making its automatic evaluation an unsolved problem. We address this challenge by proposing a novel synthetic vision dataset, named FunnyBirds, and accompanying automatic evaluation protocols. Our dataset allows performing semantically meaningful image interventions, e.g., removing individual object parts, which has three important implications. First, it enables analyzing explanations on a part level, which is closer to human comprehension than existing methods that evaluate on a pixel level. Second, by comparing the model output for inputs with removed parts, we can estimate ground-truth part importances that should be reflected in the explanations. Third, by mapping individual explanations into a common space of part importances, we can analyze a variety of different explanation types in a single common framework. Using our tools, we report results for 24 different combinations of neural models and XAI methods, demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of the assessed methods in a fully automatic and systematic manner.